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Abstract 
 
From humble beginnings at the local pub Loftet at Askøy, Torsdagsklubben utilized 
their social networks and human abilities to gather musicians, finances, equipment, and a 
location to create a festival named Lost Weekend.  In few years, Lost Weekend was on its 
way to become one of the largest festivals at Vestlandet1, but after ten years of production the 
festival was discontinued. 
The research question of this thesis was “why festivals fail”.  To answer this question, 
in the case of Lost Weekend, a capital framework and product life cycle theory was applied.  
Life cycle theory was used to establish if there were differences in use of capitals during the 
life cycle stages. The capital framework had its start with Bourdieu’s (1986) cultural capital, 
where an additional six has been added during the years.  All seven capitals in the capital 
framework were for the first time applied by Mykletun in his study of Ekstremsportveko in 
2009, where the administrative capital were described and added. 
All ten years of Lost Weekend were analyzed through the capital framework, and 
attempts were made of identifying the festivals progress through its stages of the product life 
cycle. 
 
Key words: Festival failure, capital framework, life cycle theory, Lost Weekend 
                                                 
1 Vestlandet is a name for the western part of southern Norway.  It includes the four counties Møre and 
Romsdal, Sogn and Fjordane, Rogaland, and Hordaland 
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Preface 
 
I chose to create my master thesis on the basis of the Lost Weekend festival on Askøy, an 
island outside of Bergen because little research has been done to identify reasons of failure in 
the festival setting.  From 2001 – 2010, Lost Weekend created a gathering point for 
Askøyværinger (inhabitants of Askøy) of all ages, where we all had a chance to see people we 
only saw in the first weekend of August, spending our summer vacation working at Lost 
Weekend.  It was for me, and perhaps for others, a necessary ending of the summer months 
before I went back to school and to work.  
When Lost Weekend finished in 2010, I was attending this Master program where one of 
my professors was Reidar Mykletun, who later became my advisor for this thesis.  Thank you 
very much for all your support, interest and inspiration. 
Huge thanks to all the people from the Lost Weekend festival who has contributed to this 
thesis by both answering my survey and giving me invaluable comments and information.  
Too many should be mentioned, though many of you wish to be anonymous. Some shall 
however be thanked with names. 
Tom Johannessen, thank you for giving me a great interview and for starting Lost 
Weekend.  None of this had been possible without you. 
Frank Robert Webermann, thank you for visually documenting all years of Lost 
Weekend and for letting me use your pictures in this thesis. 
Espen Isager, thank you for taking care of much of Lost Weekends archives, and for 
allowing me access to them.   
Finally, thanks to my family for all your support. 
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In recent years there has been an increase of numbers in Norwegian festivals.  At the 
same time, several festivals suffer serious deficits which results in failure.  A study done by 
Norsk Rockforbund showed that of their 42 members in the festival genre, 20 of them 
experienced financial losses in 2008 (“Dagens Næringsliv”, no date available at website).  
Also one of the festivals in Norway with perceived high success experienced bankruptcy in 
2008.  This was the Quart festival, and in 2009 the Hove festival followed.  Both of these 
festivals were icons in the festival industry in Norway that failed due to misuse of resources.
  
 To study why some festivals fail while others succeed is relevant in our contemporary 
surroundings.  Early in the 1990s, European researchers began to question how long the 
growth of festivals could continue.  In 1993 there were reported to be 900 festivals occurring 
in the UK on a yearly basis and that a “saturation point” could be reached in the near future 
(Getz & Andersson, 2009).  By comparison, Norsk Rockforbund estimated the number of 
festivals in Norway to reach 500 - 600 in numbers by 2008 (“Dagens Næringsliv”, no date 
available at website).  Since the Norwegian population is considerably less than the British, 
and the population is the target group of any festival, speculations can be made if the 
Norwegian festival scene already has reached its saturation point.  If there is a saturation point 
in the Norwegian context as well, it could be important for Norwegian festivals to identify 
how they can avoid being one of those festivals that will, if the saturation point has been 
reached, be forced to discontinue.     
Askøy.  The case study used in this research is a festival called Lost Weekend which went 
bankrupt in 2011 after holding annual festivals for ten consecutive years on Askøy.  Askøy is 
an island 20 minutes drive outside of Bergen in the west of Norway with a population of 
24.993 in 2010 (“Store Norske Leksikon Online”, changed 7.8.2010).  Askøy is connected to 
the main land by a bridge built in 1992. 
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The island has a small basis for tourism, with only Herdla Inn who creates public 
overnight possibilities, although there are several private persons renting out cabins during the 
year (“Visit Askøy” a, 2008).  At Herdla, there also exists a bird Sanctuary, an airstrip that 
was in use during the Second World War, golfing possibilities, and a museum dedicated to 
natural, cultural, and historical events on Askøy (“Visit Askøy” b, 2008).   
 Askøy also features Strusshamn which have an old tradition of both administrative and 
industrial significance on Askøy.  Strusshamn was visited by King Kristian 4. both in 1599 
and in 1641, and were also where the town hall resided until 1958 when it was moved to 
Kleppestø, the now contemporary center of Askøy.  There has been 100 years of mill activity 
in Strusshamn, followed by 100 years of “sjoddi”2 production.  Strusshamn were in use for 
sailors requiring a safe haven before the entrance to Bergen since the 1700 century, and were 
also where ships which required quarantine were sent (“Visit Askøy” c, 2008).  There are two 
burial sites on Askøy dating back to between 500 – 1000 years A.C. (“Visit Askøy” d, 2008). 
Lost Weekend 
 
Lost Weekend was founded in 2001 by a group of friends that met every Thursday at the 
local pub to jam, drink, and socialize, and the festival had its opening day August 3. 2001, six 
months after the planning started.  Lost Weekend was a rock music festival for those over 18 
of age arranged over three days.  It was designed as a Not-for-Profit organization and goals 
was to 1) give local bands a chance to play at a professional stage and 2) to give any surplus 
not needed to sustain the festival back to the cultural community.  Lost Weekend was based 
on idealism, volunteerism, and, entrepreneurship in the local community of Askøy.  From the 
original festival, a festival called Young and Lost were founded for those less than 18 years, a 
recording studio named Lost Records which were both based on monetary and volunteer 
                                                 
2 Sjoddi is the recycling of spin material from natural fibers such as silk, cotton and wool.  
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support from Lost Weekend, while several other organizations benefited from the production 
of Lost Weekend.   
The problem 
 
After ten years of annual festivals, Lost Weekend had their last festival in August 2010.  
Lost Weekend suffered from problems that varied from economical problems, loss of 
networks, and changes in motivations; something that in the end lead to the fall of Lost 
Weekend.  The festivals suffered from unstable organizational issues, where some people 
involved at a point no longer wished to participate in organizing the festival, while some were 
not wanted by the organization.   
Similar to humans, an event will also be created, grow, mature, and in the end die (Getz, 
2002).  As mentioned in the introduction, a warning of the saturation point being reached in 
the UK was given by Jones in 1993 based on a report from the Policy Studies Institute in 
1992.  They observed that “over one half of festivals experienced losses and concluded that 
organizers would find increasing difficulty in competing for audiences. Further, many lacked 
basic marketing skills and could not generate sponsorships revenue” (Jones 1993, as cited in 
Getz, 2002).    
Research question 
 
The question this research wish to discuss is why festivals fail, and will be analyzed in 
a Norwegian context with the use of a specific case study from a Not-for-Profit community 
festival named Lost Weekend.  Research to understand some of the pitfalls a community 
festival can encounter is needed in a Norwegian context because there are still many festivals 
created each year.  This research has as purpose to trace the history and life cycle of Lost 
Weekend and to analyze the festival through a capital framework.  It further seeks to give 
indications of faults committed internally in an organization based solely on volunteerism and 
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idealism, and where the organization is created with the purpose of delivering Not-for-Profit 
enjoyment for others.  
 The history of Lost Weekend will be presented through data collected from newspaper 
archives and records from Lost Weekend.  A questionnaire adapted from Getz (2002) will be 
sent via Facebook to a selection of individuals who were actively involved in the organization 
through the 10 years, and several key individuals will be interviewed.  Data will be evaluated 
and analyzed by applying the capital framework, before the festival will be analyzed through 
product life cycle theory.   
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Theoretical choices  
 
This chapter will provide the outlines for theory applied to evaluate results found 
through analyses of the data collection.  A purpose of this chapter is to examine different 
approaches needed when analyzing Lost Weekend later in the study.  Some theoretical 
positions which will not be discussed, but rather serve as meaningful for the overall 
understanding of Lost Weekend are presented.  Theoretical choices were made on basis of 
research done by Mykletun (2009) “Celebration of Extreme Playfulness: Ekstremsportveko at 
Voss” and Getz (1992) “Why Festivals Fail” by combining the teoretical framework of 
capitals with life cycle theory as a means to analyze Lost Weekend. 
The chapter consists of two main parts which firstly focuses on seven inter-related 
capitals which is used to evaluate the event.  Secondly, the product life cycle will be 
evaluated, which combined with the capital framework will be used as tools to analyze Lost 
Weekend.  Stakeholder theory, resource dependency theory and organizational learning will 
also briefly be examined. 
Festivals, planned events and their impacts or functions will be defined at the 
beginning of this chapter to create a framework of the research.  
Defining planned events.  A planned event is by definition a happening that “has 
been designed… or facilitated, and would not otherwise occur” (Getz, 2007a, p. 9).  Planned 
events are designed to “achieve specific outcomes, including those related to economy, 
culture, society and environment” (Getz, 2007a, p. 21).  When planning events, the theme, 
setting, program, services (and more) defines the event, which in turn creates the frame of the 
event and what the guests or stakeholders visiting can expect to experience by participating.  
The event may then be experienced as a liminal/liminoid zone or a time and space outside the 
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‘ordinary’ life which exists in the minds of the visitors to the event.  Experiences of each 
visitor are unique, and are created by the overall design of the event, as well as the interaction 
with other people (Getz, 2007a, p. 21).  
 
 
 
 
(Getz, 2010, p. 179) 
 
Defining festivals.  “A festival should have something to do with culture, it should 
be artistic… A music festival should have more than one expression. A festival should be a 
social happening, and should contain some film, theater, art, décor, good food; have a 
framework” – Toffen Gunnufsen, leader the Quart festival (Bergens Tidene, 10.11.2005) 
“A festival should be festive… It should last more than one day, even though one-day 
festivals exist. Diversity and duration are the key words, together with the festive” – Jostein 
Gripsrud, PhD and institute leader for information and media science, University of Bergen 
(Bergens Tidene, 10.11.2005  ) 
The liminal/Liminoid zone        
(Time out of time: A special 
place) 
Conative, cognitive and affective 
dimensions of experience, 
modified by the level of 
involvement/engagement 
Antecedents:               
Needs, motives and 
expectations: mood      
Preparation 
Separation          
Valorization 
rituals   Entry 
statements 
Reversion:            
Feeling of loss, 
renewal, 
transformation 
Changing needs, motives expectations                                   
Event careers (involvement, specialization, serious leisure) 
Time out of time 
A special place
Figure 1 The Planned Event 
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The term ‘festival’ started out with a definition that only embraced religious events. 
Getz (2007a, p. 31) described festivals as “themed public celebrations”, but a classic cultural-
anthropological definition of festivals were developed by Falassi (1987) where festivals were 
described as “a sacred or profane time of celebration, marked by special observances”. 
Falassi (1987) further developed this definition with the description of festivals as  
“…periodically recurrent, social occasion in which, through a multiplicity of forms 
and series of coordinated events, participate directly or indirectly and to various degrees, all 
members of a whole community, united by ethnic, linguistic, religious, historical bonds, and 
sharing a worldview. Both the social function and the symbolic meaning of the festival are 
closely related to a series of overt values that the community recognizes as essential to its 
ideology and worldview, to its social identity, its historical continuity, and to its physical 
survival, which is ultimately what festivals celebrate”. (Falassi, 1987, as cited in Getz, 2007b, 
p. 31)  
From this definition it may be possible to assume that it is not only the individual 
directly involved with the creation of a festival, but that the whole community becomes 
affected with the start and ending of festivals in their area.  Community festivals contribute to 
a feeling of identity and self-esteem to the habitants of a location, as well as contributing to 
the local economy.  
As described by Falassi, Lost Weekend mainly had a social function at Askøy, but 
there were no tradition for festivals in the community when it started in 2001.  Instead, Lost 
Weekend created a new social identity in Askøyværinger (inhabitants of Askøy) through 
using existent traditions such as volunteer work and music.  It was an annual meeting point 
for all ages of Askøyværinger and visitors, where a social aspect may have overshadowed the 
actual content of the festival.  Because of this, this research will use Getz’s definition of 
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festivals as themed, public celebration as a definition of festivals in the case of Lost 
Weekend.   
 
Stakeholders.  Different groups who are involved in a festival are the stakeholders.  
A stakeholder group either influence the organization, or the organization influence the 
stakeholder group (Getz, 2007a, p. 91).  
 
 
Figure 2 Major Stakeholder Types and Roles in Festival Networks 
 (Getz, Andersson, & Larson, 2007) 
 
The different stakeholder groups described in Figure 1 are not mutually exclusive, and 
in some cases stakeholders have multiple roles (Getz, 2007a, p. 270).  For instance, a 
regulator group can be local politicians which decide if the festival is allowed to be arranged.  
Co-producers 
 Independent orgs. that 
voluntarily participate 
Festival 
Organization 
 Owners/investors 
 Directors 
 Employees 
 Volunteers 
 Members 
 Advisors 
Allies and collaborators 
 They provide intangible help 
 Partners in marketing, etc 
Regulators 
 Their approval and 
cooperation are required 
 
The impacted 
 The audience 
 Others affected by the 
festival or the 
organization 
Facilitators 
 Their resources and support 
makes the festival possible 
Suppliers and venues 
 Often becomes sponsors/ 
partners 
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At the same time, some politicians may be a part of an organization working as volunteers at 
the event, and becomes co-producers as well.  Others may attend the event, and will be one of 
the impacted.  
According to (Getz & Andesson, 2008) there are three main perceptions arrangers of 
festivals may have of their stakeholders; they collaborate, support, or threaten the festival.  
How the different stakeholder groups are perceived by the management influences strategic 
choices made by the management on how to relate to their key stakeholders. For instance, if a 
stakeholder is hostile to an event, different strategies have to be applied than when an 
indifferent, collaborating or friendly stakeholder is involved. 
Stakeholders of Lost Weekend will not be evaluated separately in this research, 
although Lost Weekend had many stakeholders who related variously to the festival.  This 
section was included to increase general understating of their stakeholders and the influence 
they had on the event, and will assist in identifying stakeholders in the findings.  
Event organization.  Various ownership models are used when classifying events.  The 
main three are identified as 1: The Private For-profit companies who arrange events, 2: The 
Government agencies/public-private groups, which include the government of parks, sports 
and different cultural events 3: The Not-for-Profit sector, which is the largest sector of the 
three and include clubs, festivals, and charities (Getz, 2007a, p. 264). 
1. Private for-Profit companies are organized as other competitive businesses without 
subsidizes or sponsorships.  In for-profit companies there are owners and employees, 
and usually there is a hierarchical build within the organization. 
2. Government agencies or the public-private groups create events to serve the 
community or for public entertainment, many times for free or a small fee.  A problem 
with this form of ownership is the complex bureaucracy which follows when spending 
‘the tax payers’ money. 
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3. Not-for-Profit organizations are based on volunteerism, subsidies and sponsorships, 
where the main issues are focused on governance and coordination.  There is no clear 
leadership from the beginning, and the individuals may have differencing views on 
how to run the organization.  Such organizations are also externally threatened by 
organized groups which may attempts take- over’s if the event is deemed desirable 
(Getz, 2007a, p. 265).  
Capital framework 
 
The forming of a festival in a community relies on the use of different forms of 
resources that can be found in the festivals surroundings.  If the festival represents the identity 
of the community, it may be possible to assume that the festival will be well rooted in the 
local community.   
To evaluate the different uses of recourses, seven capitals that “can be seen as the 
representations of recourses employed to facilitate any kind of human activity” (Mykletun, 
2009) will be used.  The concept of interrelated capitals as descriptions of resources was 
presented by (Bourdieu, 1986) with his introduction of cultural capital as a “denotation of 
reciprocal relationships that develop within networks” (Mykletun, 2009).  Burt (1995) added 
financial-, human- and social capital in the competitive arena, followed by Ashley (2000) 
who created the concept of natural capital through her research in rural areas in Namibia. 
Misener & Mason (2006) introduced a physical capital, and finally, an administrative capital 
was added by Mykletun (2009) through his studies of Ekstremsportveko at Voss. Mykletun’s 
evaluation of Ekstremsportveko will be the theoretical foundation of this research.  
Mykletun’s research was where the seven capitals first were applied to analyze a festival. 
Seven capitals to evaluate festivals 
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1. Cultural capital is owned by the individuals within the same frame of reference 
(cultural references), is not transferrable without personal involvement but can be 
inherited through generations.  It can also under certain conditions be transferred into 
economic capital because it is argued that a cultural root may lead to benefits that 
individuals outside that specific cultural setting are denied access to (Bourdieu, 1986). 
This capital embraces the heritage, customs, and traditions, of individuals and the 
culture they belong to.  
2. Financial capital is the economical aspect that includes reserves, credit, revenues, and 
creates the economic base for the production of “raw materials and production 
facilities” (Burt, 1995).  This is an ‘individualistic’ capital since the finances are 
owned by a person or an organization.  
3. Human capital is the individual’s natural abilities, such as “charm, health, 
intelligence, and looks” (Burt, 1995), “courage, motivations, competencies” 
(Mykletun, 2009), combined with formal education and abilities. The human capital 
may develop the financial capitals production capacity into a competitive product 
(Burt, 1995) if utilized as a mean to acquire financial capital. 
4. Social capital is the individual’s networks and possibilities for access into multiple 
arenas.  Through networks, the social capital creates the work that is put into action by 
the human and financial capital.  This capital is owned by several, since it requires a 
group to network, share knowledge, resources, and information. 
5. Natural capital is the natural resources already existent at the location of interest 
(Mykletun, 2009).  These resources can be preserved or strengthened by activities in 
the community, or the use of them can lead to a conflict of interests with the daily 
users.  The wrong use of natural capital can lead to pollution or destruction of the area 
(Ashley, 2000).  
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6. Physical capital is the infrastructures, equipments and buildings needed to reach a goal 
(Misener & Mason, 2006). 
7. Administrative capital is the politics, rules, and regulations of public goods controlled 
by elected public servants in a community or organization (Mykletun, 2009) which 
can either assist or hinder an event. 
These capitals formed the basis of which Lost Weekend were analyzed.  All available data 
on the festival were gathered and categorized in their appropriate capital.  Because of massive 
amounts of information, only results deemed important to create an understanding of Lost 
Weekend were presented in this research.  
The life cycle of an event 
 
While several case studies have been done on festival success stories, few studies have 
been published on failures.  Getz (2002) did however do a study where he identified two 
general schools of thought on organizational change and failure.  Firstly, the resource 
dependency theory was presented which implies that managers or organizations can adapt to 
changes in the environment by developing strategies to ensure survival.  The second was 
population ecology theory which includes a sector, such as festivals in whole.  Both of these 
theories are included in the concept of product life cycle, but only resource dependency theory 
will be presented as relevant for this study. 
Resource dependency theory.  Most organizations are dependent on other 
organizations because of recourse interdependency.  Interdependency occurs when one 
organization “does not entirely control all of the conditions necessary for the achievement of 
an action or for obtaining the outcome denied from the action” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).  
Interdependencies can be separated into outcome interdependency and behavior dependency.  
With outcome dependency, possibilities in the marked will determine the success for two or 
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more organizations.  In the case of festivals, there may be several events in the same area 
competing for the same resources, and the independent choices made by festival A concerning 
price, theme, services, (and more) will influence not only the success of festival A, but also 
the outcome of festival B (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).  With behavior interdependency, 
activities within a festival cannot be accomplished without the participation of other 
organizations.  For instance, without volunteer organizations working at an event, the price of 
arranging the event would be too high, and the festival could not executed (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 2003).    
 Worst case scenario for a festival is to depend on just one source of resources, because 
it renders the festival extremely vulnerable if that source decides to stop supporting the event. 
Getz (2002) also called for considerations made related to  
1. The scarcity of resources (alternate resources) 
2. The nature of the festival’s operational environment (symbiotic or competitive; see 
below) 
3. Certainty versus fluctuations in resource availability (long term support guaranteed) 
4. Variability in resource needs (same needed every year?) 
 
 Another distinction in interdependency theory is made between organizations that 
either is in a state of competition or in a state of symbiosis.  If an organization experiences 
resource competition with another organization, usually only one of them will get the needed 
resources, and one organization will have a better outcome than the other organization.  In a 
symbiotic state, different resources are needed to operate the organizations where the outputs 
delivered by one organization will be the input in another (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).   
Between festivals there will usually be a situation of competition of resources since 
most are Not-for-Profit festivals based on sponsorships, subsidies and volunteer work. 
According to Getz (2002) how an organization “fit” into its environment could determine its 
success, because to be successful the festival need support from the local community.  The fit 
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between a festival and the community is determined by “how an organization adapts to 
accommodate environmental contingencies” (Donaldson, 1996, as cited in Getz, 2002).   
Organizational learning.  Organization should be ‘learning’ organizations to cope 
with environmental changes. According to Marnburg3 (2001), the main challenges learning 
organizations are facing are 1: The individual competence development 2: The individual use 
of competence 3: How the individual competence is shared with others within the 
organization (Marnburg, 2001, p. 88).   
In an organization, individuals are required to work together to meet goals but forces 
that assist learning in organizations may be inhibited.  Marnburg (2001) defined two main 
reasons for limitations on learning in organizations; “the practices of the past and the 
uncertainty of the future” (Marnburg, 2001, p. 88).  The ‘practices of the past’ represent the 
base of which the organization is built through the incorporated “rules, norms, routines, goals 
and values” (Marnburg, 2001, p. 88).  These are maintained by the social structures in an 
organization, and influences choices made by the organization in the past and present because 
the organization try to reduce the uncertainty often felt when exploring new possibilities.   
The problem with such practices is that an organization governed by the past is poorly 
equipped to handle its continually changing environment.  To be able to handle a changing 
environment, existing practices should be challenged and corrected for if needed.  
Life cycle theory 
 
“Every consumer ‘product’, including events, has a life cycle” (Getz, 2007a).  
Festivals, as consumer events, experience a similar process, although the “validity and 
universality of the life-cycle model has not been proven” (Getz, 1992).  The full life cycle of a 
product and when an event moves through the different stages may not be predictable, but all 
events have a time of discovery, a period of growth followed by decline (Christaller, 1964).  
                                                 
3 All text from Marnburg (2001) is translated from Norwegian to English by the researcher 
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Theory of a destination life-cycle was further developed by Butler (1980) who described 
seven stages of a tourist areas development of popularity over a period of time:    
An area first enters into an exploration (discovery) stage where there are a small 
number of guests visiting, high interaction with locals and where there are no venues directed 
specifically at visitors.  The coming and going of visitors have little or no impact on the social 
or economical climate of the festival or location.  In a festival setting, this would be the first 
years of production when the festival is relatively unknown to others than the immediate local 
community. 
 
 
Figure 3 Product Life Cycle 
(Butler, 1980) 
 
Involvement is the second stage where number of visitors heightens and locals may 
begin to create facilities to accommodate the visitors.  The interaction between visitors and 
locals are still expected to be high or even higher for those who cater for the visitors.  The 
festival may initiate basic advertizing campaigns directed at possible visitors, and may 
experience pressure to establish transportation routes for the visitors. 
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   The third stage is the development (growth).   At this stage the festival is well defined 
as a location, mainly because of heavy advertizing campaigns.  The interaction between locals 
and tourists decline rapidly at the same time as locals lose control of the development.  The 
natural and cultural specifications of the festival will be directly marketed, and man-made 
facilities will be supplemented to accommodate the visitor’s needs.  Changes made at the 
festival’s location may not be welcomed by locals (Butler, 1980).  The type of tourists may 
have changed at this stage from the explorer to the institutionalized visitor as described by 
Cohen (1979).   
By the fourth stage, the location reaches consolidation where visitor rates, although 
still high, slows in growth.  Major advertizing campaigns attempt to draw in visitors to extend 
the tourist season and a large part of the local economy is linked with tourism.  Because of the 
large number of visitors, locals may be restricted from otherwise “normal” activities.   
Stagnation is the fifth stage, and is identified by the number of visitors reaching its 
peak.  The festivals capacity limit is also reached, with environmental, social and economical 
problems as a result.  The festival is out of fashion, and there is a heavy reliance on repeated 
actions and trade.           
A final stage is decline, where a festival is no longer able to compete with newer 
attractions and will therefore loose visitors. At this stage it is possible that the location 
completely loses its tourism function.  If the festival is able to create new attractions or use 
new resources to draw in visitors, it may be able to reach an alternate stage to decline; 
rejuvenation.  Is this stage is reached; the life cycle of a product may start again. 
This description of a life cycle is perhaps more fitting if the destination is the main 
attraction, but events need not be a visitor attraction to begin with, but rather something 
offered to the local community.  Because of this the attractiveness of a destination may not 
vary accordingly with the popularity of an event (Getz, 2002).    
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Life cycle theory is the second major theory of which analyses of Lost Weekend were 
based.  After each year had been analyzed with the capital framework, attempts were made to 
identify when Lost Weekend reached each stage and which occurrences contributed to the 
development, consolidation and decline of the festival. 
Previous research on Lost Weekend 
 
This rapport was mailed to the researcher of this thesis by the Lost Weekend festival 
manager in 2008, Lillianne Hantveit Førgaard.  
In 2008, Lennart Fjell, a cultural scientist from the University of Bergen created a 
rapport of the visitors to Lost Weekend where he asked 274  or 3, 22% of visitors present on 
Lost Weekend in 2008 how they perceived the festival.  He found three main conclusions; 1) 
Lost Weekend had an important social function for the communities in proximity of the 
festival and 2) that the visitors spend a high amount of money at the festival, and 3) visitors 
went to Lost Weekend to experience a social gathering more than because of the musical 
program. 
 He recommended that if Lost Weekend should be preserved, a core of visitors had to 
be established and the size and organizing of the festival had to be in accordance to these 
visitors.  In the economical aspect of Lost Weekend, the festival needed better management, 
better care given to the volunteers and to better use the potential created by the masses of 
visitors.  Latent dangers for Lost Weekend were identified as lack of proper organization, 
wrong usage of potential, and how the visitor motivations were perceived by Lost Weekend 
(www.festivalresearch.com/LW%20rapport%20web.htm).   
Theoretical data analysis model 
 
Capital framework will applied to data to achieve an understanding of each year of 
Lost Weekend.  Through analyzing information found by the capital framework, Lost 
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Weekends life cycle stages of will be determined.  As mentioned, these two theories are the 
main analyzing theories, while resource dependency, organizational learning, and stakeholder 
theory will be used as supportive theories for improving the general understanding of Lost 
Weekend’s situation.  Figure 4 is included as a visualization of data analysis through capitals, 
where the model was conceptualized by Elo & Kyngäs (2008) while definitions were 
established by Mykletun (2009).  
 
 
      
Figure 4 Analytical Model 
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Method 
 
 To evaluate the research question of why festivals fail by using the Lost Weekend 
festival as the case study, a qualitative approach was selected as appropriate for the main 
analysis.  A quantitative approach was however applied on a survey sent to a selected group 
of volunteers and Staff members.   
Several sources of information were applied to gather data about Lost Weekend. 
Primarily, the written material was found in newspaper articles dating from 2001 until 2011 
and archival files from different Lost Weekend board members.  Photographs were collected 
from newspapers and private sources to illustrate different situations which occurred at Lost 
Weekend and incorporated when found appropriate.  
 Together with the written material from a variety of achieves, key individuals were 
interviewed to gather supplement and filling information about their opinions and experiences 
from Lost Weekend.  Finally, the mentioned survey was sent to a sample group to gather their 
opinions of why Lost Weekend failed. 
 The Municipality of Askøy and Bergen og Omland Friluftsråd4 (BOF) were contacted 
on several occasions, both by E-mails and by telephone, in attempts to gain access to their 
archives.  Unfortunately, none of these administrative instances replied on the repeated 
inquiries, although the Municipality of Askøy did verbally assure the researcher that they 
would assist.  Because of lack of information from the administrative groups involved in Lost 
Weekend, data is missing to assure a more complete assessment of Lost Weekend.  The 
outcome of this group as a capital may also have differenced from the findings in this research 
if the possible information from these groups had been incorporated.  
                                                 
4 Bergen og Omland Friluftsråd, controllers of Kollevåg. They decided if Lost Weekend could lend the area. 
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Historical research; a quick introduction 
 
Historical research analyses data to create an understanding of the past through 
considering the context, actors, and the continuity the studied event (Lapan & Quartaroli, 
2009, p. 147).  In this case study, the event will be Lost Weekends ten years of production.  
The review of LW's history is intended to find factors, both internal and external, that 
contributed to the festival's failure.   
The context of which historical research in analyzed includes aspects such as the 
economical, cultural, social, intellectual and political situations, and will in this paper be 
evaluated through the capital framework presented earlier in the literature chapter.  The actors 
are the persons or organizations that were involved in forming the event which is studied 
(Lapan & Quartaroli, 2009, p. 147).  
When designing a historical research, all sources of relevant information have to be 
analyzed, evaluated and “show any evidence of causation or motive, if indeed it is evident” 
(Lapan & Quartaroli, 2009, p. 147).  In historical research, there may be conflicting 
information, or counterevidence that has to be acknowledged.  Also counterarguments or 
alternate interpretations of secondary sources compared to the findings of another researcher 
have to be taken into account, and arguments of why one conclusion is more accurate than 
another should be given (Lapan & Quartaroli, 2009, p. 157).  
Sample.  A non-random sample was applied in the survey and interviews to gather the 
needed information to create a historical picture of Lost Weekend.  While there are several 
techniques within non-random sampling, this research used snowball sampling combined with 
the researcher’s general knowledge of Lost Weekend members and volunteers.  The 
researchers identified some individuals who had the characteristic or knowledge needed in the 
research, and gained access to new candidates to include in the study through the preliminary 
candidates (Neuman, 2006, p. 223).  This sample method probably did not deliver a 
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representative sample, but may be an appropriate approach to the sample group in this 
situation where restrictions were placed on who could participate in both the survey and 
interviews. 
Newspaper articles.   Data were gathered about Lost Weekend through newspaper 
articles and archives from the local newspaper Askøyværingen, the regional newspapers 
Bergens Tidene and Bergensavisen, and national newspapers Dagbladet, Verdens Gang, and 
Dagens Næringsliv. The media interest in Lost Weekend stated with the local newspaper, and 
grew to a national scale during the evolvement of the festival.  
Approximately 200 articles were read, systemized and analyzed in accordance with the 
capital framework in a festival setting.  This implies that when a found was done in a capital, 
the information was categorized within the fitting capital.  Each year were analyzed separately 
and in time-line style to keep the readability of the thesis.  
 Articles from years between 2001 and 2004 were mainly gathered through private 
collections of articles from several newspaper sources.  From 2004 until 2011, databases of 
the mentioned newspapers were searched and relevant articles were gathered. Articles which 
were not included in the study contained reviews of concerns and band information. 
 Some weaknesses of newspaper articles as a source were identified.  Firstly, all 
articles were translated by the researcher from Norwegian to English.  This may have lead to 
both a loss of intent from the author of the articles as well as a loss of information contained 
in the articles.  Other weaknesses may have been the level of involvement in Lost Weekend of 
the authors of the articles, especially those written for the local newspaper, Askøyværingen.  
If the authors did have a personal connection to the festival, it may be assumed that their 
subjective opinion of Lost Weekend was expressed through their work.  At the same time, the 
personal involvement in Lost Weekend of the researcher in this thesis may also influence the 
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objectiveness of which the articles were interpreted, although all attempts were made to be as 
objective as possible. 
Private archives.  The private archives utilized include several photographs and 
written material gathered from different Lost Weekend board members.  Access to this 
material was gained through personal affiliations the researcher had to Lost Weekend and 
members of the organization.  Written data could only be gathered from 2004 until 2010 
because those involved in Lost Weekend in years before 2004 either lost their files, had 
changed computers where the information were stored, or had not kept material at all.  
Members of Lost Weekend from 2001 – 2003 were contacted in attempts to acquire written 
material from that early period, but none were gathered.  Because of this, a lack of internal 
organizational information from the years 2001 – 2003 could not be avoided, and is a 
weakness for the total impression of the internal affairs of Lost Weekend. 
 ‘Real’ documents and other material from 2004 – 2010 were however acquired; for 
instance minutes from board meetings, letters to creditors and sponsors, media statements, 
budgets, organizational maps, and task descriptions in the organization.  Photographs were 
allowed to be used in this thesis by the informal festival photographer Frank Robert 
Webermann who visually documented all years of Lost Weekend. 
 The real data collected through private sources where incorporated with the findings 
from newspapers, analyzed with the capital framework and categorized to validate the data.  
Interviews.  Nine in depth interviews with key persons were conducted to fill gaps 
between the written public and private material.  The focus of questions in the interviews was 
adapted to each individual because of their different roles in Lost Weekend, but the general 
intent of the interviewer were to gather the respondents personal opinions and experiences 
from Lost Weekend.  Because of this the interviews had a semi-structured open ended design, 
which allowed for freedom and spontaneity in the respondents (Hellevik, 1977, p. 124).  
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Interviews were performed as much as possible face to face with the respondents, but three 
individuals were unable to meet with the researcher in the allocated time frame for the thesis, 
and were interviewed by telephone.  Directly after the interviews were completed, they were 
transcribed and fitted into the overall capital analysis model.  
 Those who were seen as key persons by the researcher included the founders of Lost 
Weekend and other prominent board members during the ten years.  Only one refused to be 
interviewed.   
While writing this thesis, the researchers encountered other individuals from Lost 
Weekend who also wanted to contribute and who has been active in commenting specific 
situations in this research.  These conversations were usually done in a social setting, and 
statements were written down with the permission of the individual in question.  Such 
statements will be referred to as ‘Volunteer comment’, while Staff or volunteer comment on 
Why Lost Weekend failed was gathered from the survey. 
Survey.  The survey was taken from Getz (2002) “Why festivals fail” and were in his 
context executed on North American  IFEA (International Festivals and Events Association) 
members, where the purpose of the survey was to “gain information about festivals… and 
discuss problems regarding festivals with which they are associated” (Getz, 2002).  In the 
context of this research, the goal was to gather information of why respondents thought Lost 
Weekend failed.  The questions in the survey published by Getz were firstly translated from 
English to Norwegian, where the intended meaning of the questions was deemed with higher 
importance than the specific wording of the questions.  A few questions were also added to 
clarify some of the questions, while others were removed because of lack of relevance for this 
research.  
The survey contained 41 questions within 6 different areas, where the respondents 
were asked to mark their response at the appropriate response. They could choose between 
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“not a reason”, “a possible reason”, “a clear reason”, and “do not know”.   The survey also 
opened for comments to each question and the possibility to add other issues at the end. 
Finally, respondents were asked to write how many years they participated at Lost Weekend 
and what position(s) they held in the organization (see Appendix A for full survey in 
Norwegian).   
The survey were distributed to two respondent groups; board members/higher level 
Staff and “normal” volunteers.  The meaning behind separating the two groups was to see 
differences in opinions between the groups of why Lost Weekend failed.  A questionnaire was 
sent to 23 board members/Staff and 27 “normal” volunteers, where a total of 15 Staff 
members and 17 volunteers were accepted as a part of the study.  The reason for a low 
number of individuals was that a specific criterion was set for participation; respondents had 
to have participated for a minimum of five years at Lost Weekend.  This criterion was set 
because of the nature of the question; Why Lost Weekend failed. The researcher believed that 
if individuals lacked a well established knowledge of Lost Weekend, the question could not 
be answered properly.  Results were presented at end of findings but because of a low number 
of respondents, the choice was made to not integrate it in a larger degree.  Instead it was used 
as a support of other sources. 
The survey was made in a system created by Google Documents.  There it was 
possible to create the survey and send a link to the respondents via Facebook.  All 
respondents had to fill out the entire form to be able to send the reply and each reply was 
recorded in Google Documents, which later were transferred to Excel where responses were 
analyzed.  Responses were recorded separately and to secure that no one answered twice, and 
all responses were recorded with time, date, and most respondents sent a message via 
Facebook to the researcher after they replied.  To send a confirmation of response was the 
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respondents own choice was not encouraged by the researcher.  This may have compromised 
the anonymity of respondents, but apparently they had no such concerns.  
Usage of a social media to gather responses proved effective, and the majority of 
answers were received during the first five hours after the link were sent.  Responses were 
automatically recorded and separated into two different spreadsheets by Google Documents, 
and were later categorized and analyzed.  Findings in the survey will be presented later in the 
research.  
Data analysis 
 
All data collected in this research were primarily analyzed in a qualitative inductive 
manner because of the historical research design and lack of complete existing information 
and knowledge.  Analyses were done through open coding and categorizing of the available 
information into the capital framework (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008).  Through coding and 
categorizing the information, the data were compromised into manageable sizes, which 
“provide a mean to describe the phenomenon, to increase understanding and to generate 
knowledge” (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008).  
Reliability and validity.  Reliability is based on dependability of findings.  In other 
words, results should be consistent if they were examined again under the same or similar 
conditions (Neuman, 2006, p. 188).  Because this is single case study, it may not be prudent to 
generalize findings in this study to other festivals or events.  The researcher does however 
believe that an in-depth case study may create a thorough understanding of Lost Weekend and 
their experiences as a local community festival in Norway.  All findings were cross-examined 
with different sources to establish results, and through triangulation of sources raised the 
reliability of findings within the setting of Lost Weekend.  Triangulation occurred by utilizing 
all sources previously described by supporting or excluding data and findings.  By combining 
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the gathered information and empirical experience held by the researcher the belief is that the 
accumulated data is to be trusted. 
Validity in qualitative studies often replaced with authenticity, which in this context is 
defined as “giving a fair, honest, and balanced account of social life from the viewpoint of 
someone who lives it every day” (Neuman, 2006, p. 196).  This study has in every account 
attempted to create a truthful picture of Lost Weekend’s development and decline both from 
an external stance and from the people who were involved in Lost Weekend.  Validity was 
further raised through examining results found by the researcher in comparison with the 
reasons given for Lost Weekend’s failure by Staff and volunteer members through the survey 
and through the researcher’s own experience of Lost Weekend. 
  Critique to data analysis.  When data was analyzed through the capital framework 
in accordance with the conceptualized analytical model, a problem with conflicting points of 
view were discovered because Lost Weekend could both be analyzed from an external and an 
internal view.  In other words, a stance had to be taken if this research main focus should be 
on how the festival perceived their surroundings or on how the surroundings perceived the 
festival.  This research did mainly focus on an external view where Lost Weekend was 
analyzed through the perceptions of its surroundings.  Statements and comments from 
individuals inside the organization were used as a supportive tool for the external perceptions, 
but may have influenced interpretation of data which could have lead to a change in stance.   
 
Because of the historical research design, complete sets of data were impossible to 
obtain.  Instead the available information from each year were collected, evaluated and 
analyzed.  The researcher is aware that if complete data were collected, the outcome of this 
thesis may differ from the results which are presented here. 
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Pre­understanding and reflexivity.   In a qualitative paradigm of data collection 
and analysis, the researcher and informant co-create the reality described in the study because 
of their continuously interaction, and the researcher’s “present, knowledge, and interest in the 
study object may also affect the findings” (Pereira, 2007, p. 118).   
 In the case of this study, the researcher has an extended pre-knowledge of the Lost 
Weekend festival both because of her involvement and attendance at the festival from 2002 
until 2011, and because the researcher grew up on Askøy where Lost Weekend were held.  
She was also involved in several groups pre - Lost Weekend which eventually connected with 
the festival (for instance Torsdagsklubben and Vinn Ungdom, who later co-arranged Yong 
and Lost).   
The researcher was a member of the group who was the entrepreneurial forces behind 
Lost Weekend and held several positions within the organization during all ten years.  She 
experienced the changes that took place both internally in Lost Weekend as well as socially 
external on Askøy because of the festival and the feeling of pride and unity it resulted in. 
Because of this involvement in the organization over several years, the researcher was 
pre-exposed to many of the issues Lost Weekend faced.  She was also known to all of the key 
informants in this study, something that proved positive because it was easier to gain access to 
the informants and free responses at interviews.  Some problems were however experienced 
while conducting interviews, mostly because of the researcher’s familiarity with Lost 
Weekend and the respondents.  Interviews were in some instances cancelled or postponed by 
respondents, perhaps because of an emotion of friendship between the researcher and 
respondents which allowed for a greater sense of flexibility from both sides.  As mentioned, a 
few interviews had to be conducted by telephone because of several cancellations from 
respondents.  Another, and perhaps more serious issue, was the researcher’s subjective 
influence on interviews and opinions of Lost Weekend.  The researcher attempted to be 
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objective at all times, but are aware that in a setting where two friends who share the same 
experiences of an event are in a dialogue, it is difficult not to lead the interview in one 
direction or another.  A weakness of the data gathered through interviews is because of that 
the general objectivity.  This familiarity with respondents may have some strength at the same 
time; because of an informal and friendly atmosphere.  Respondents did perhaps feel more 
comfortable and open in sharing their opinions with a friend compared to a stranger who had 
little knowledge of the underlying social structures of Lost Weekend.  
In the questionnaire part of the study, several issues were raised.  The first was when 
the questionnaire created by Getz (2002) was translated from English to Norwegian.  Efforts 
were made to translate the questions by intent and not exact wording, but this might have 
compromised the survey because the same sizes may not be measured in this survey 
compared to Getz.  The sample group may have been too small to measure anything of 
relevance outside of Lost Weekend but as argued before, the attempt was to receive 
informative data from individuals who had knowledge about Lost Weekend and possible 
reasons for failure. 
  While an extended pre-understanding of the research object may produce difficulties 
with bias, it can also contribute to an improvement of reliability and validity if balanced 
correctly (Pereira, 2007, p. 120).  Achieving this balance has been the attempt of the 
researcher throughout the research.  
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Results in time­line 
 
 This chapter starts with a short presentation of the rock music environment of Askøy 
through 40 years, before the findings from different sources will be presented in a 
chronological order based on year.   
A brief history of Askøy rock.  “We have always known that we can make a 
festival. Now we have proven it.  All technical aspects have run smoothly.  This was a perfect 
beginning and we received praise from all the artists!” -  Eirik Minde after the first Lost 
Weekend (Bergensavisen, 3.9.2001) 
 The story of Lost Weekend arguably started years before the festival was arranged in 
2001.  Already in the 60’s the first rock bands started to appear on Askøy, two who early 
received national recognition.  The band Allison, won in 1980 the Norwegian Championship 
(NM) in rock, and in 1987 the Askøy band Tomboy received a Gold plate (Gullplate) and 
Spellemannsprisen for best pop album. 
Back at Askøy in the early 80’s, an old house which were in use by the occupying 
forces during the second world war as a pig farm started serving as a rehearsal house for 
bands.  The house was named the Pig House or “Grisehuset” after its former use.  In the 
beginning only one band called Wild Cat rehearsed there.  They were allowed to use the 
house free of rent, and the electrical company on Askøy provided them with free electricity.   
By the late 80’s, Wild Cats opened up Grisehuset for other bands, and an already 
established rock club called Øen Rockeklubb moved in.  From Øen Rockeklubb, several 
known artists emerged. (For instance, Jørgen Træet, one of Bergens best studio mixers, who 
strongly influenced the first Bergensbølgen5.  Also Stig Narve Brunstad was one of the 
                                                 
5 Bergensbølgen is a designation of musical influences from the Bergen area 
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original members of Øen Rockeklubb, and is currently touring worldwide with the band 
Datarock).  
When all the different fractions of the rock environment finally gathered in Grisehuset 
they started to organize themselves and both the new and the older generation of Askøy 
rockers started hosting concerts and recycling bottles to afford to purchase a PA-system6. 
 
 
Picture 1 Grisehuset (Photo: Frank Robert Webermann) 
 
After almost a decade in Grisehuset, with rock, concerts and parties, the house was 
crumbling around them.  In the winter of 1994/1995, the rockers move to Huset in 
Bakavågen, a gift from the Municipality, with all their accumulated equipment.  One of the 
key persons who moved with was “Rocke-Reidun” Mikkelsen.  She organized what was then 
known as Askøy Rockeklubb by creating rosters, collecting membership dues and applying 
for public funds.  After this formalization of Askøy Rockeklubb, they started arranging 
Ungdommens Rockemønstring, and by 1996 Askøy Rockeklubb had about 150 members.  
This was the beginning of the end for the club; three years later the membership numbers 
were more than halved.  One of the reasons may be that even though Askøy Rockeklubb were 
                                                 
6 PA is short for Public Address and is a designation of large sound systems 
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given Huset by the Municipality with good intentions, the club was left with all the costs of 
maintenance of the building and high electrical bills.  
What saved the musical environment of Askøy from completely dissolving at that time 
was the possibility to practice rigging stages, working with lights and sound, and play at 
youth gatherings in Askøyhallen.  Bands could also book a time slot to practice in Løfjellet 
which served as a youth club.   
Many people involved in the music environment from the époque of Grisehuset and 
Huset started to move to Bergen when Huset began to lose interest.  Amongst them were 
Thomas Lønnheim, drummer from Ralph Myerz and the Jack Herren Band, and Fredrik 
Saroea, singer from Datarock.; both these bands went on to play at the Roskilde Festival.  
Around the year 2000, Askøy Rockeklubb was as mentioned close to defeat, but at that 
time the rockers started to attend jams, open stage, and social interaction at Loftet in Florvåg, 
which was arranged through Torsdagsklubben.   
 
 
Picture 2 Jam at Loftet Pub (Photo: Frank Robert Webermann) 
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The thought of a larger music festival started to form, and after a less than sober night 
cap, Lost Weekend was formed with Tom Johannessen as its leader.  By joining forces with 
rockers from Askøy who contributed with music through their bands, as light or sound crew, 
or as volunteers, Lost Weekend was arranged for the first time in August of 2001. 
The presented background of Askøy rock history was gathered by Chris Møller, (2009) 
in relation with his Bachelor thesis and mailed to the researcher.  It was used in this research 
with his permission.  
The entrepreneurship.  The Lost Weekend festival was created based on a wish to 
give artists from Askøy and Bergen the opportunity to perform on a large stage.  As described 
by Møller (2009), Askøy Rockeklubb was at this time in turmoil when they met up with 
Torsdagsklubben.  Torsdagsklubben was originally an offspring from Askøy Ten sing7 where 
they for years had been hosting as well as performing concerts.  
“For us to arrange a concert was no big deal.  We did not have to rent equipment or 
sell tickets to pay anybody.  Everything was for free and happened on a volunteer basis.  It 
was just something to do so we had something to talk about the next day.  Or the day after 
that, because we were usually really hangover the ‘next’ day. It was very easy to do because 
it was free of cost.  All that were needed was our effort” - Tom Johannessen, talking about the 
time at Ten sing. 
One can perhaps say that it was a great coincident that both Ten sing and Askøy 
Rockeklubb at the same time had evolved and was searching for something new, and 
speculations can be made whether or not Lost Weekend would have been created under 
different circumstances.   
The first three people involved in Lost Weekend were Tom Johannessen, a then 24 
years old and employed as an assistant teacher and worked at Askøy youth club, Lars Erik 
                                                 
7 Ten sing is a Christian choir/music group  
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Pedersen (21), the owner of the local pub, Loftet, and Eirik Minde (21), a local musician who 
got accepted to LIPA8 that year. 
“Lars Erik owned a pub and had access to equipment.  Minde were a gathering point 
for musicians and were extremely experienced compared to his age …  We did not have a 
steady 8-4 job or school to attend, so we had the time, resources and were perhaps stupid 
enough to think that this was possible” - Tom Johannessen 
These three were the main forces behind the fist Lost Weekend because of their life 
situation at the time, but they were shortly after joined by others that were interested in 
creating a festival.  The first board was finally made up by seven; Tom Johannessen, Eirik 
Minde, Ståle Haugland, Lars Erik Pedersen, Frank Hertzberg, Kenneth, and Frank Steinfeldt 
(Askøyværingen, 24.8.2001)  
 
 
Picture 3 First Board members of Lost Weekend (Askøyværingen, 24.8.2001. Photo: Linn Dyveke Wilberg) 
 
There are several stories told surrounding the motivations for starting Lost Weekend.  
The story told the media usually contained a version of a night where Frank Steinfeldt and 
                                                 
8 The Liverpool Institute for Performing Arts 
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Johannessen was drinking and playing Play station, got bored and came up with the idea of 
Lost Weekend.  Johannessen however told a different story of his motivations for the start of 
Lost Weekend.  He explained that the motives for starting Lost Weekend were egocentric, and 
that the good feeling he experienced when arranging concerts and discotheques for teenagers 
at the youth club was what he was striving to achieve.  
 “To be totally self-centered, it started when I worked at a school and a youth club 
where I experienced something completely new; arranging something for others and then 
receive positive feedback … It was like the best intoxication in the world” - Tom Johannessen  
 
Before we begin.  The history of the cultural position of rock/popular music on 
Askøy, as well as the motivations behind the beginning of the festival has now been explored 
to create a backdrop for the coming re-telling of the history of Lost Weekend.  In the time-line 
series, data will only be presented, before the accumulated results are discussed at the end.  
This design is chosen because it simplifies the reading and understanding of the study.  Each 
year will be analyzed in accordance with the presented capital analyze model. 
The data used to give evidence of each main category is based on articles, interviews 
and records collected.  When each year has been analyzed, all ten years will be summarized 
and the survey will be incorporated with the researcher’s findings of the group analyzed.  
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Year 1: Lost Weekend 2001  
 
Lost Weekend was the first large rock festival since Herdla-festivalen in the early 
1970’s.  The Lost Weekend board was early on described as idealists by several Medias such 
as newspapers and radio stations (NRK P3-Kaliber, 07.10.2001). 
 
 
 
Lost Weekend explained that they had created the festival because they thought no 
‘real’ music festivals were happening in the west of Norway at that time.  They expressed to 
the media that their motivations for arranging Lost Weekend was that they wished to place 
Askøy ‘on the map’ and help young people on Askøy who wanted to play music 
(Askøyværingen, 28.8.2001).  Askøy did not have a tradition with its own rock festivals at 
that point, and only a couple of hundred people from Askøy travel to music festivals during 
the year (Askøyværingen, 4.10.2001). 
2001 was the first time the festival is called Norway’s most beautiful festival by Totto 
from the national radio channel P3.  He described Kollevågen as a beautiful nature resort with 
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a Viking inspired beerhouse in the middle, surrounded by the sea (NRK P3-Kaliber, 
07.10.2001).  
 
 
Picture 4 The Viking House at the Festival Area (Photo: Bergen og Omland Friluftsråd) 
 
“The world’s most beautiful festival is homemade and ready for kick off” 
(Bergensavisen, 31.8.2001) 
Lost Weekend needed 623 paying guests in 2001 to meet their budget on 400.000 
NOK, which was a third of the deficit of Fløyen-festivalen, a festival arranged for the first 
time in 2000 in Bergen.  This moderate budget was a result of much volunteer work and 
bands playing for free or lowering their fees (Bergens Tidene Net, 4.8.2001).  One week 
before the festival, the Lost Weekend board told media that they had sold 400 tickets, and that 
they were pleased with the result (they compared themselves with Fløyen-festivalen who only 
sold 150 tickets before the festival) (Askøyværingen, 24.8.2001).  The total number of tickets 
out for sale was 3.600, but the ticket sales ended at about 700 in total.  
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The stage and sound/light equipment were procured through network channels.  The 
stage was borrowed from Askøydagene because the father of a board member had a contact 
within that group, and the sound/light came from one that usually helped Lars Erik Pedersen 
with concerts at Loftet (Interview, Ståle Haugland).  Most of the work building the festival, 
such as the administrative tasks and providing the festival area with fences, stages, light, and 
signs were done by the board and their extended friends and families.  Exceptions of 
volunteer work were security, scene techniques, and serving (Askøyværingen, 28.8.2001).  It 
was also possible for visitors to camp to Lost Weekend from year one.  For those who did not 
like to camp, festival busses were going back and forth to the festival area during the days and 
nights.  
From an early stage the politicians took an interest in Lost Weekend, even though they 
did not directly supported the event from the start. They did however help to financially 
arrange a youth concert held at Loftet Pub at the same time as Lost Weekend.  
Bård Sandal9 was positive of Askøy profiling itself as a musical island and was 
impressed by the Lost Weekend board’s initiative (Askøyværingen, 3.8.2001).  Sandal told 
Askøyværingen that he was going to attend as both a guest and as a volunteer at Lost 
Weekend.  He thought it was a positive contribution to the cultural life on Askøy, but could 
not promise any monetary support from the Municipality at this stage.  Sandal did however 
state that if the Municipality received an application for financial support before next year’s 
festival, he thought that it would be granted.  This was based on his opinion of Lost Weekend 
as an excellent arrangement, perhaps the best cultural happening Askøy had ever hosted.  He 
hoped that both Lost Weekend and the teen-age event will be an annual happening because of 
the positive signals Lost Weekend created for the youth on Askøy (Askøyværingen, 
31.8.2001).  
                                                 
9 Cultural manager on Askøy in 2001, employee of the Municipality of Askøy 
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Politicians and businesses on Askøy waited until the last week before kick off to back 
Lost Weekend financially although they did get a bank guaranty for 167.000 NOK the 27.aug. 
2001, four days before the festival’s kick off in 2001 (Askøyværingen, 28.8.2001).  The bank 
guaranty secured by Lost Weekend 27.aug. 2001 was given because of a clear network 
connection, which Johannessen doubts could have happened outside of Askøy.  
“We were just one week away from the festival and half of the bands would not play 
because we did not have money to pay the advance.  There are no other places than Askøy 
where you get a loan on 167.000 NOK without security because you went to school with the 
bank manager’s son” – Tom Johannessen 
Lost Weekend 2001 was a success even though there were few visitors, but Lost 
Weekend ended up with a deficit close to 150 000 NOK.  The board had calculated a deficit 
of 50 000, so the amount tripled from the expected.  The economy manager, Kenneth 
Steinfeld, believed that the deficit would be covered by bank guaranties until they could 
produce the money. 
“The arrangers should be satisfied because they delivered a superb arrangement for 
artists, guests, rescue teams, and the general population of Askøy.  Next time this gang should 
get the full support from the public, businesses, and the inhabitants of Askøy” - Harald O. 
Clausen, responsible editor (Askøyværingen, 4.10.2001) 
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Picture 5 Camping Area Lost Weekend (Photo: Bergen og Omland Friluftsråd) 
 
Summary 2001.  To summarize capital use each year the model described in 
Theoretical data analysis model will be applied.  In this research the capital framework will 
not only be evaluated as present or not present, but graded to the perceived extent a capital 
influenced each year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A grey background indicates that the capital was not present that year while an orange 
background indicates that capital either went from grey to present, or that a capital was 
perceived as a negative influence on Lost Weekend.  Yellow background indicates that the 
capital were present but not utilized to full potential.  A light green represent either an 
improvement from yellow or a decline from green; capital is present, but not used as well as 
GREY Not present 
ORANGE Somewhat present or worsening of capital 
YELLOW Present, but not utilized fully 
LIGHT GREEN Present and improved, but not as well used as possible 
GREEN Large presence 
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possible.  A green background indicates large presence of capital potential within the case of 
Lost Weekend.  
Human, social and natural capital was the main capitals in 2001, and strongly present 
due to the already established groups and networks created through Torsdagsklubben and 
Askøy Rockeklubb.  
The natural capital of Lost Weekend was Kollevåg, a recreation area controlled by 
Bergen og Omland Friluftsråd (BOF).  The journey from the camp to the concert area was a 1, 
4 kilometers walk, so the total areal of the festival area was large to manage for Lost 
Weekend.  
The area was surrounded by the sea on one side and a forest on the other.  On the 
camping area there was a sand beach where visitors could swim if the weather was too hot.  
All artists were transported from Seilsportsenteret (which were used as headquarters for the 
transportation group) with volunteer yachts to the concert area, something many artists were 
very excited about.  Totto (P3) named Lost Weekend Norway’s most beautiful festival, which 
was their slogan for years.  
The natural attributes of Kollevåg created the perfect frame for Lost Weekend as a 
relaxed festival and was a well chosen place to arrange the event.  Kollevåg was chosen 
because of its beauty and is a constant capital since the same location was used all years. 
Natural capital will not be commented again in the summaries, as interactions with the owner 
BOF are defined as administrative capital. 
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Financial capital was not well represented in Lost Weekend 2001, and was only 
gained through a bank guaranty from Nordea due to personal connection.   
There was a low degree of physical capital in 2001.  However, a strong social capital 
made the festival possible, because all needed equipment was borrowed to the festival for free 
and volunteers were working to run the festival itself.  Bands were also playing for low 
payment or for free.  The administrative capital was applied in a supportive youth 
arrangement, but not in Lost Weekend itself, while cultural capital was not present in 2001 
since there was no recognition or tradition in the community for Lost Weekend.   
Lost Weekend 2001 was an innocent festival with pure enthusiasm as the driving force 
behind it.  The entrepreneurs involved wanted to ‘do something’, and created a three days 
festival with extremely limited physical and financial resources.  Because it was completely 
based on enthusiasm, arranging a three days festival perhaps succeeded the abilities of the 
arrangers, since already year one the festival experienced a deficit.  
It was excellent PR for Lost Weekend that a national radio station named it the most 
beautiful festival in Norway before the festival had even started.  Totto from P3 was a friend 
Figure 5 Capitals 2001 
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of an Askøyværing who heard about the festival, visited, and came up with the slogan that 
was used for years to come. 
 “I got anxious sometimes, laid awake at night and thought about what I really were 
doing” – Tom Johannessen 
Year 2: Lost Weekend 2002 
 
 Lost Weekend survived their first year and entered into their second year.  BOF was 
very dissatisfied with the cleanup process after the festival in 2001, and the Municipality of 
Askøy stepped in to assist Lost Weekend to renew their agreement with BOF.  The new 
agreement was as follows; 
1. All neighbors are to receive thorough information about LW 
2. Concerts are to be held Thursday, Friday and Saturday. The Thursday concerts are to 
end at 02.00.  
3. It is forbidden to drive vehicles in the nature resort 
4. The barrier leading to the festival area must be locked at all times, except when 
equipment and goods are delivered. 
5. By Thursday 15. the whole area, including the road and parking space is to be cleared 
and cleaned, so the area can resume normal use.  
(Askøyværingen, 28.5.2002) 
 
This year Lost Weekend was held in the second weekend of August, and instead of 
being held from Friday to Sunday, the festival now started on Thursday and culminated on 
Saturday (Askøyværingen, 1.02.2002).  About 100 volunteers each day were ready for Lost 
Weekend in 2002; both youth and their parents assisting.  Younger volunteers worked with 
administrative and executive tasks while the adults worked as security.  The general age of 
volunteers averaged somewhere between 40 and 50 years (Bergens Tidene, 9.8.2002). 
At the start of the festival there were about 30-40 tents in place at the camp (Bergens 
Tidene, 9.8.2002).  
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“As a feeling of community, this is fantastic! People are much nicer when we share a 
space.  There is so much life here and the camping area is idyllic.  The mood is good and 
people are easy to get to know”- Festival participant 2002 (Askøyværingen, 13.8.2002). 
 
 
Picture 6 Tom Johannessen and Kenneth Steinfeld at Kollevågen Before the Festival 2002 (Photo: Frank Robert 
Webermann) 
 
Lost Weekend received 40.000 NOK from Norsk Kulturråd in February of 2002 
(Askøyværingen, 8.2.2002), but by June the Sherriff of Askøy tried to stop Lost Weekend 
because they did not meet their condition of having 60.000 NOK in bank guaranty by June 1.  
The police had to wait until April of 2002 to receive the payment promised by Lost Weekend 
to cover the police’s expenses during the arrangement in 2001, and they were not willing to 
wait that long this year.  The Sherriff did promise that if Lost Weekend could raise the money 
fast they would reevaluate the application.  Johannessen did not see an immediate solution to 
the claim of 60.000 NOK set by the police, because only the small and new businesses were 
willing to sponsor Lost Weekend.  Although Lost Weekend tried to reach out to the larger and 
established businesses, this produced little result.  Johannessen told Askøyværingen that with 
a little help and “risk capital” they could achieve much and the festival could gain recognition 
outside of Askøy, but in June they only had 18.000 NOK (Askøyværingen, 7.6.2002).   
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In July, with the second Lost Weekend only one month away, they received the 
necessary bank guaranties and the festival could be arranged, thanks to Ringnes, Norsk 
Kulturråd and local sponsors.  Lost Weekend was this year as well denied financial support 
from the Municipality of Askøy (Askøyværingen, 10.7.2002).  Also in July, Sparebanken 
Vest decided to sponsor Lost Weekend with 10.000 NOK (Askøyværingen, 24.7.2002). 
Lost Weekend’s goal in 2002 was to delete the debt of 167.000 NOK from last year 
(Askøyværingen, 16.8.2002).  Immediately after the festival, the estimated deficit was about 
20.000 NOK although Lost Weekend had no indication of the deficit because some expenses 
grew during the festival.  After all expenses were calculated, Lost Weekend’s deficit from 
2002 ended at 60.000 NOK.  Together with the deficit from last year, the total owed by Lost 
Weekend at that point was 227.000 NOK where 170.000 NOK of this was a loan due in 
September.  Along with a short term loan on 50.000 NOK, it threatened the future of Lost 
Weekend.  Johannessen hoped that creditors would give the festival some goodwill and 
extend the payment deadline (Askøyværingen, 30.8.2002).  All seven board members took 
private bank loans to be able to arrange the festival in 2002 (Askøyværingen, 23.8.2002). 
The Municipality of Askøy did give 5.000 NOK to Lost Weekend as a deficit 
guaranty, but this was perceived by the board as if Lost Weekend were last on the prioritizing 
list of the Municipality.  
As a response to different newspaper articles published about the financial problems 
Lost Weekend experienced, the local community at Askøy started to raise money for the 
festival.  A fast-food restaurant (JAFs!) at Askøy gave 25.000 of its own PR budget to Lost 
Weekend and started as well a fundraiser for Lost Weekend.  They explained to the media that 
it was important for other businesses as well to see the financial potential in arrangements 
such as Lost Weekend, and the general PR effect Lost Weekend had for Askøy 
(Askøyværingen, 11.6.2002).  Aarhus, the bank manager of Nordea Bank, and chairman of 
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Askøy Næringslivsforening, told Askøyværingen that Lost Weekends financial situation was 
a challenge they could assist with.  Nordea were active as a guarantor in 2001 as well and 
Aarhus claimed that Lost Weekend was serious but simply inexperienced (Askøyværingen, 
14.6.2002) 
“They have probably learned from their mistakes and avoid doing the same mistakes. 
It is important that ‘the grownups’ show support to Lost Weekend and appreciate their effort” 
– Aarhus, bank manager of Nordea and chairman of Askøy Næringslivforening 
(Askøyværingen, 14.6.2002) 
“We are strongly connected with the local community and people here spend more 
time together than people behind other festivals. We have a base in Torsdagsklubben so 
people are well coordinated even though we are ‘happy amateurs” – Tom Johannessen 
(Askøyværingen, 24.7.2002) 
The Municipality where asked to cover some of Lost Weekend’s debt from 2002, but 
when Askøyværingen talked to the Municipality of Askøy, they said that the applications for 
financial support for Lost Weekend had not yet been evaluated because the request was sent 
too late (Askøyværingen, 13.8.2002).  Johannessen was disappointed by the Municipality of 
Askøy, claiming that they talked about Lost Weekend when they needed to praise the youth 
on Askøy but did not even reply to their applications about financial support (Bergens Tidene, 
1.8.2001).  It seemed to Lost Weekend that the Municipality did not realize that Lost 
Weekend were one of the largest festivals in the whole region (Vestlandet) (Askøyværingen, 
6.8.2002). 
Summary 2002.  There were few changes in the capital use in 2002 compared to 
2001.  The main change was a worsening of the financial capital because of an increasing 
debt.  Even so, there existed a strong connection to the local community and smaller 
businesses which noticed the importance a gathering point as Lost Weekend could have for 
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Askøy in general.  The local Nordea branch was the only major business that believed in Lost 
Weekend, and as mentioned, was because of Johannessen attending school with the bank 
manager’s son.   
Human and social capitals held by the Lost Weekend board were still the main reason 
why the festival was arranged.  
 
 
 
Lost Weekend experienced small changes of physical capital in 2002; the only 
changes were implemented by the agreement between BOF and Lost Weekend and an 
addition of one stage. 
The Municipality of Askøy had started to see the value of the festival and did attempt 
to help it, but in the early 2000 Askøy was one of the poorest Communes in the area, which 
made it difficult to lend financial support.  They could however give social support, and did 
so because of their negotiations with for instance BOF and the continuing positive comments 
to the public about Lost Weekend.  Improvement of local administrative capital in 2002 is 
indicated with light green in the model.  Cultural capital was not present in the community in 
2002. 
Figure 6 Capitals 2002 
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Year 3: Lost Weekend 2003 
 
Lost Weekend 2003 featured like last year two stages; one for electronica and hip hop 
and one for rock and pop.  This year Lost Weekend had made an agreement with 
Eggstokkfestivalen10 in Bergen which would continue until 2010, where the winner got the 
opportunity to play at the festival.  Torsdagsklubben still held on to their starting point of Lost 
Weekend featuring local bands each year.  They also promised to continuing hosting concerts 
for the teenagers at Askøy (Askøyværingen, 4.3.2003). 
 
 
 
Each of the three days of Lost Weekend started with a headliner to draw visitors early 
to the festival area.  Last year many visitors stayed at the camp instead of visiting the festival 
area and by presenting headliners early, Lost Weekend hoped to countermeasure this 
(Bergensavisen, 4.3.2003). 
                                                 
10 A festival for unestablished bands in the Bergen region 
The Rise and Fall of Lost Weekend: A case study  56 
In 2002, close to 2500 visited Lost Weekend but the collected debt of the festival has 
grown to about 380.000 NOK (Bergensavisen, 4.3.2003).  Creditors of Lost Weekend started 
to get impatient by March of 2003, so Lost Weekend was reliant on success this year to be 
able to pay creditors and keep the festival running (Askøyværingen, 7.3.2003).  Budgets 
delivered to the Presidency when Lost Weekend applied for a guaranty showed that the actual 
deficit of Lost Weekend in 2001 were 170.000 NOK.  This was blamed on bad weather 
leading to low income on ticket sales in 2001, while the deficit in 2002 on 200.000 were 
blamed on lack of volunteerism and higher prices on electricity (Askøyværingen, 13.6.2003).  
Lost Weekend did manage to acquire new sponsors for the festival in 2003; something that 
may was a contribution to the good result in 2003. 
 
Table 1 Sponsors 2003, Guaranties Excluded 
    
 Sponsors Amount  
 
Communal 
support 80.000  
 Chess 100.000  
 Ringnes 50.000  
 Sparebank 1 25.000  
 Mix kiosk 25.000  
 Norsk Kulturråd 40.000  
 Total 320.000  
    
    
Lost Weekend calculated that they needed 1800 visitors to achieve a surplus.  Ticket 
price has been raised by 150 NOK compared to last year (weekend pass was now 650 NOK).  
There were about 200 volunteers at the festival, and many expenses were saved by this 
(Bergens Tidene, 7.8.2003). 
 Lost Weekend, the Mayor, and cultural manager of Askøy met to discuss possibilities 
of financial support to the festival in March of 2003.  After this meeting the Presidency at 
Askøy had to decide if they were going to give a guaranty of 165.000 NOK to Lost Weekend.  
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If they had decided against the guaranty, Lost Weekend would not be able to continue 
because they had to have 65.000 NOK in guaranty to the police by June 1., as well as 100.000 
NOK in guaranty to the company lending them the sound and light equipment, AVAB CAC 
(Askøyværingen, 7.3.2003).   
“Høyre and Fremskrittspartiet were skeptical and did not want to say anything before 
the case has been discussed.  SV and AP were positive to placing the money as guaranty. Åge 
Rosnes (SV) said that Lost Weekend was good PR for Askøy, and was representative as 
positive youth/volunteer work.  AP said that the conditions for such a guaranty had to be 
discussed, because it was not common to give partial guaranties for an arrangement” - Tor 
Halvorsen, Askøyværingen (Askøyværingen, 23.5.2003) 
The Presidency needed to see the budgets for Lost Weekend 2001 - 2002 before they 
decided if they should grant the guaranty of 165.000 NOK because they wanted to know how 
Lost Weekend handled previous deficits.  All members of the presidency were praising the 
arrangement and initiative, but aware of that if they place the guaranty they probably had to 
pay it as well.  The Municipality had already given 80.000 NOK to the festival, which 
brought the total sum with guaranties to 245.000 NOK in support (Askøyværingen, 
30.5.2003).   In June of 2003, with 8 against 3 votes, the Presidency did decide to grant the 
guaranty of 165.000 NOK to Lost Weekend (Askøyværingen, 20.6.2003). 
Lost Weekend 2003 started with a new PR stunt where they invited all interested 
media and sponsors to join them on a cruise from Bergen to Askøy to see Kollevåg.  At sea, 
the guests were catered for and could experience some bands from Bergen and Askøy that 
would be playing at the festival. The local bands also had the opportunity to interact with well 
established national bands, such as in the picture below.  
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Picture 7 Media Cruise. National Band Thulsa Doom/Black Debat With Local Askøy Band Rockatanzky (Photo: Frank 
Robert Webermann) 
 
Tents first came up at the camping area Wednesday, one day before the opening day, 
while Thursday there were long lines of people waiting to buy tickets in the entry area 
(Askøyværingen, 8.8.2003).  With about 3500 visitors present, cars were parked a kilometer 
up the road in each direction of the path leading down to the festival area (Bergens Tidene, 
11.8.2003).  By Friday there were close to 140 tents at the camp (Bergens Tidene, 9.8.2003).  
 
 
Picture 8 Lost Weekend Camping Area (NRK.no) 
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Lost Weekend 2003 ended with a surplus with 3-4000 visitors, and the whole 
arrangement had run smoothly with a lazy festival mood over Kollevåg (Bergens Tidene, 
10.8.2003).  Johannessen thought that Lost Weekend was guaranteed a positive income; 
probably enough to cover the two previous year’s debt (Bergens Tidene a, 11.8.2003).  After 
Lost Weekend paid the debt to Nordea, they received the following letter: 
From Nordea: “Vedlagt følger et gjelsbrev med kvittering for full innfrielse av lånet… 
Nordea vil gjerne benytte anledningen til å gratulere gjengen bak Lost Weekend med godt 
gjennomførte arrangementer.  En så stor festival hadde ikke latt seg gjennomføre uten stor 
innsats av et profesjonelt mannskap, og med kvalitet i alle ledd    Vi ser frem til et videre 
samarbeid med Lost Weekend” (Askøyværingen, 26.8.2003).  
December 2003, Norsk Kulturråd granted the festival 100.000 NOK in support of Lost 
Weekend 2005 (Askøyværingen, 17.12.2003). 
The editor in chief of Askøyværingen praised the volunteers that made Lost Weekend 
possible through their faith in their vision of the festival, which most likely lead to a debt free 
festival.  He believed that Lost Weekend had a positive effect on the youth of Askøy because 
it has shown that by fighting for what you want, you might get it (Askøyværingen, 
12.8.2003). 
 “That it is possible to make such a festival on Askøy is great!  Actually, it is 
excellent”! - Maren Johansen, Askøyværing (Askøyværingen, 12.8.2003). 
“I do not usually feel proud of the fact that I am from Askøy, but this weekend I did” - 
Lasse Bjarte Hove, from Askøy and lives in Bergen (Bergensavisen a, 11.8.2003) 
“There is no doubt.  There will be a Lost Weekend next year” – Einar Engelstad, 
(Bergens Tidene, 10.8.2003) 
Summary 2003.  From 2002 to 2003, several capitals improved.  For instance a 
general acceptance of Lost Weekend had started to arise compared to the two previous years 
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and cultural capital became visible in the community.  Financially this was the first year Lost 
Weekend ended with a surplus large enough to pay their debt and before the festival several 
new sponsors had been gathered.  The actual resource use in Lost Weekend cannot be 
commented because of lack of complete information. A summary will however be presented 
later.  
In this research, financial support from public instances will also be included as an 
administrative capital because of the external validating effect such support offers.  The 
administrative capital was strongly present this year, locally by guaranties placed by the 
Municipality of Askøy and nationally through grants donated by Norsk Kulturråd.  The social 
capital was also prominent, because the festival connected with new sponsors and other 
organizations, which may have contributed to the financial capital.  Most newspapers in the 
region (Askøyværingen, Bergensavisen, and Bergens Tidene) were extremely positive to the 
festival both before and after, praising it for the location as well as the organizing and content.  
The physical capital were somewhat improved with a second stage at Kollevåg, but no major 
improvements were executed. 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Capitals 2003 
Generic categories/ 
Capital framework 
Cultural 
Financial 
Human 
Social 
Physical 
Natural 
Administrative 
Lost Weekend 
in 2003 
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There was a minor shift in the human capital, with Johannessen stepping down as the 
leader of the festival.  This did however not impact the human capital in any significant way. 
The community had faith in the festival, and as mentioned above, the feeling of community 
pride had also started to rise.  Lost Weekend had started to create an identity for Askøy and its 
inhabitants, which is represented by the cultural capital moving from grey to yellow.  
Year 4: Lost Weekend 2004 
 
“The gang behind Lost Weekend are unafraid youth with nothing else than an 
unstoppable courage and optimism that took on the task of creating a festival Askøy can be 
proud of” - Rolf Erik Veland, Askøyværingen and previous vocalist in Allison, 1980 
(Askøyværingen, 21.7.2004)   
 
 
 
Lost Weekend received their first award, Bergensprisen in 2004.  This was an award 
given by ‘Natt & Dag’, a free newspaper which covered entertainment news.  Lost Weekend 
won in the category Best Leisure Improver in 2003. 
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Picture 9 Johannessen With Bergensprisen (Photo: Yngve Johnsen Askøyværingen 10.2.2004) 
 
This year Baby-Torsdagsklubben was founded with help from Torsdagsklubben 
(Askøyværingen, 21.7.2004).  The members of Baby-Torsdagsklubben were under aged youth 
who wanted to learn how to arrange concerts, and they arranged the Young and Lost festival 
for those under 18 years of age.  Lost Weekend was behind the project and had the financial 
responsibility, but the execution of the arrangement was the responsibility of Baby-
Torsdagsklubben.  
 
Picture 10 Baby‐Torsdagsklubben (Askøyværingen 4.6.2004. Photo: Janne Vibeke Rosenborg) 
 
The ticket sales for Lost Weekend 2004 started in March, which was a new record.  In 
2002, 47 tickets were pre sold, while in 2003 it was 1100 (Askøyværingen, 9.3.2004).  Two 
weeks before Lost Weekend started, 1700 tickets were sold (Bergens Tidene, 22.7.2004). Lost 
Weekend guarded itself from possible deficits because of visitor failure by securing a loan 
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agreement with a bank, and an interest guaranty from the Municipality of Askøy (Bergens 
Tidene, 22.7.2004).  One week before the festival 3000 tickets were sold, compared to 3-400 
tickets in total last year (Bergens Tidene, 3.8.2004), and 1000 more was sold before the 
opening day.  At least 2700 people were present at the opening of Lost Weekend 2004 
(Bergens Tidene, 6.8.2004) and Friday there were 5400 visitors at the festival area (7.8.2004 
– Bergensavisen).  Johannessen said that Lost Weekend’s budget had at least doubled since 
the beginning in 2001 (Askøyværingen, 3.8.2004). 
‘Lillescenen’ grew this year from being an extra stage where only local bands played, 
to being a popular stage for every audience.  The festival also bought new sound and lighting 
systems, and a new ‘token’ system in the bar.  The new main stage was bigger than the one 
used the previous years and the electrical systems for all stages were improved and now 
featured fixed power.  Almost 300 workers were present each day at Lost Weekend; this 
number also included paid help such as the fire department, the police, and ‘folkehjelpen’ 
(Askøyværingen, 21.7.2004) 
 
 
Picture 11 'Lillescenen' (Photo: Frank Robert Webermann) 
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The camping area was also upgraded with lighting and with possibilities for campers 
to take a shower at the camp.  There were improved possibilities for parking private cars and a 
new road was in the planning to be built out to Kollevåg.  A kiosk was available on the camp 
which was open until 03.00 am, where visitors could buy food, condoms, and toiletries 
(Bergensavisen, 2.8.2004).  A festival bus also drove back and forth to a local mall during the 
day so campers could shop for other objects than what the kiosk could offer (Askøyværingen, 
6.1.2004).  
 
Picture 12 Festival Life at the Camping Area (Photo: Frank Robert Webermann) 
 
“The festival is a delight in the free.  The camp in Kollevågen is its own little city 
where other rules apply than by the stages – for instance a free flow of ‘refreshments’.  There 
is peaceful and festive music flowing from boom blasters, and tents in disarray amongst 
bushes and trees.  A little rain is really just fun. Perhaps people even might move into the 
concert area.  Later   Maybe   ” -  Olav Gorseth (Bergens Tidene, 7.8.2004). 
 Lost Weekend started the cleaning process immediately after the last concert but days 
after the festival, trash was still everywhere (Bergensavisen, 10.8.2004).  BOF was again 
extremely dissatisfied with the clean-up after the festival and told Lost Weekend that they had 
to present a plan of how to improve that before Lost Weekend in 2005 or they would be 
denied access to Kollevåg. 
The Rise and Fall of Lost Weekend: A case study  65 
 
Picture 13 Lost Weekend Camping After the Festival in 2004 (Askøyværingen, 3.5.2005. Photo: Linn Dyveke Wilberg) 
 
“We are so sick of the way things has been.  The state of the area after this year’s 
festival is not acceptable” – Aage A. Landro, administrative leader BOF (Bergensavisen, 
10.8.2004) 
Because of demands from BOF, Lost Weekend hired the cleaning firm Mikom to help 
them prepare a plan for next year (Bergensavisen, 15.10.2004). 
Bergens most famous music critic, Engelen, gave Lost Weekend 2004 12 points, and 
named it the most successful festival in the Vestland region in modern times; “at least if one 
uses the criteria set by Woodstock”.  He also thought that because the volunteer spirit needed 
to arrange such a festival, something similar to Lost Weekend never could be arranged in 
Bergen (Bergens Tidene, 10.8.2004).  Engelstad warned the festival of that the kind of 
success Lost Weekend experienced in 2004 had its cost, and that the festival had to become 
more professionalized to secure its position in the future, without opening for strong 
commercial forces and thus loose the idealism (Bergens Tidene, 10.8.2004). 
The number of visitors to this year’s Lost Weekend was 17.221 (Bergensavisen, 
10.8.2004) which lead to a surplus of 600.000 NOK, and as promised the festival gave 
260.000 NOK to different organizations and musicians in the local community 
(Bergensavisen, 15.10.2004).  Even though the festival secured a surplus, Lost Weekend had 
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spent 500.000 NOK more that budget. Warnings were given by music experts of such a lack 
of control, because such unforeseen expenses almost forced Quart to close in spite of a record 
in visitors (Bergens Tidene, 10.8.2004).  
Johannessen secured a 60% paid position in Lost Weekend from September 1. and had 
the first administrative position within the organization.  Johannessen thought that the festival 
now could better itself next year, because he now had sufficient time to plan (Askøyværingen, 
17.9.2004).  Tom Johannessen was also nominated and received the Name of the Year award 
on Askøy.  The following is the committee’s reason for nominating Johannessen;  
”Årets Lost Weekend i Kollevåg ble en formidabel suksess.  Mange i Lost Weekend 
styret har gjort en kjempeinnsats, og sjefen selv, Tom Johannessen, bør selvsagt være en 
aktuell kandidat til «Årets navn».  Ikke minst når vi ser at overskuddet fra festivalen sprøytes 
tilbake til Askøys kulturliv” (Askøyværingen, 30.11.2004). 
“Lost Weekend proves that volunteerism has not died, with people across generations 
helping to create the festival.  It is a great example on how communication between 
generations can happen on an uncomplicated level, where a project is so interesting that 
people ask to be a part of it” - Rolf Erik Veland, Askøyværingen and previous vocalist in 
Allison, 1980 (Askøyværingen, 30.11.2004). 
Summary 2004.  This was probably the best year Lost Weekend experienced 
externally, with financial security, a great event, and with the full support from the 
community.  Since they had managed to pay all debt the year before the financial capital was 
further strengthened by another year of positive income.  Lost Weekend could in 2004 do as 
they had wanted from the beginning; share their positive income with the musical community 
of Askøy.  This action secured the bond between the festival and the community, because 
Lost Weekend did not just create an event once a year, but an identity for several others as 
well.  Baby-Torsdagsklubben was the early stage of Lost Weekend functioning as an umbrella 
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organization for several others that worked with youth and/or music.  By this time the festival 
was accepted by the locals as an annual event, and cultural capital had further improved.  
Another indication of acceptance in the community was the awards that Lost Weekend 
received through Tom Johannessen. 
 
 
 
The physical capital of the festival was greatly improved in 2004, something that 
probably should have created a good basis for future events.  It might have been unwise, 
however, to expand to that degree after just four years of production without knowing the 
‘real’ visitor base, even though some improvements were necessary.  
There are no indications of a change in human capital of the board members of Lost 
Weekend in 2004.  However, internally in the organization this year was when the first links 
between narcotics and Lost Weekend started to emerge and the group feeling amongst the 
volunteers began to fade, something that damaged the social capital slightly.  Some 
volunteers who had been involved with Lost Weekend from the beginning started to feel 
either excluded or abused by the festival board.  One survey respondents when asked for 
reasons why Lost Weekend failed answered: 
Figure 8 Capitals 2004 
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“It became a party for the few, who pulled the ladder up behind them and would not 
let new people in.  Lost Weekend had the right of life and huge possibilities if there had been 
structure, plans and concrete goals.  When the management borrows huge yachts where they 
party hard completely screened from the “lapskaus og brus” reality the volunteers was living 
with, it became hard to sustain the enthusiasm the festival was relying on to continue.  The 
same enthusiasm the festival was built on” – volunteer comment on why Lost Weekend failed 
Year 5: Lost Weekend 2005 
 
 
 
Tom Johannessen and Lost Weekend won the Kipekjerringa culture award on Askøy 
from a unison ‘oppvekst og kultur’ committee and was the youngest receiver of this reward in 
the history of the Kipekjerringa11 award (Askøyværingen, 10.6.2005). 
                                                 
11 Kipekjerringa is a culture award on Askøy which dates back to 1985. It is given to stimulate cultural and 
artistic businesses and persons. 
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Picture 14 Tom Johannessen and the Major of Askøy, Kari Manger (Askøyværingen, 27.9.2005. Photo: Marius 
Kambestad) 
 
“Tom har fått merke at avstanden mellom nederlag og suksess ofte ikke er så stor. 
Han har tålt stress, kaos, frustrasjon og avslag.  Vissheten om at man får til det man virkelig 
vil har drevet Tom videre.  Dette årets og framtidige års festivaldeltakere kan først og fremst 
takke Tom for at festivalen i det hele tatt finnes” – Kipekjerringa committee  
Lost Weekend attempted for the first time to professionalize the organization in 2005. 
This was because they had to be able to handle the extensive growth they had experienced 
during their first four years.  Before the festival start in 2005 Lost Weekend had increased its 
camping capacity by 50% and the allowed visitor number had increased from 17.000 in 2004 
to 21.000 in 2005 (Bergens Tidene, 4.8.2005).  Amongst other activities, one volunteer who 
worked as a consultant outside of Lost Weekend tried to formalize the different roles and 
tasks of the organization.  Lost Weekend had started to attempt to create an internal structure 
in the chaos which had existed inside the organization for the first four years (for 
organizational map of Lost Weekend, see Appendix B). 
“So far we had enough with just coping with the enormous growth of the festival.  In 
the following years we could start perfecting the operational part of Lost Weekend” – Eirik 
Minde, board leader Lost Weekend 
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By 2005, the festival had become a gathering-point for youth and created rehearsal 
facilities for bands, studio possibilities as well as production and promoting companies to help 
new bands (Bergens Tidene, 4.8.2005). 
 
 
Figure 9 Lost Weekend as an Umbrella Organization 
 
Vinn Ungdom was a youth organization which worked together with the Municipality 
to arrange after-school activities and concerts for the under aged.  This organization is still 
active in 2012 and runs the youth club from the new “Huset” at Askøy.  Lost Records were a 
studio/recording company formed by board members and volunteers from the Lost Weekend 
organization.  Lost Weekend sponsored Feitaboogie Productions/Lost Records with 70.000 
NOK, and bought studio time for bands that wanted to record.  The new studio was opened by 
Bård Sandal (Bergens Tidene, 20.5.2005).  Torsdagsklubben continued to jam at Loftet each 
Thursday, and functioned as the meeting place for the volunteers during the year.  
“Askøy is a very strange place.  Perhaps it had something to do with 
Torsdagsklubben…. which are a lot of nice people from Askøy who hang out and party 
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together” – Stig Narve Brunstad, backstage volunteer Lost Weekend and band member in 
Datarock (Bergens Tidene, 4.8.2005). 
Lost Weekend hired Mikom AS to handle the clean up process at the festival in 2005. 
Together with the Municipality and BOF, Lost Weekend enforced strict rules to ensure a 
minimum of broken bottles and trash.  All glass bottles were banned from both the camping 
area and the concert area, recycling stations were set up at strategic locations, and plastic cups 
could be delivered in the bar in return for a free beverage token.  Several more toilets were 
available to visitors to avoid the use of the forests, something that both increased service as 
well as security of the visitors.  Even though these actions increase the expenses of the 
festival, this was seen as an investment (Askøyværingen, 3.5.2005). 
“Everything is on-route.  The rigging of the stage is happening as we speak, the camp 
is ready with sectioning and a fire route, and the toilets have arrived.  If everything goes 
smooth, we may have a surplus between one and two million NOK when the festival is over” – 
Eirik Minde (Askøyværingen, 2.8.2005) 
 
 
Picture 15 New Toilet Facilities (Photo: Anne Jo Lexander) 
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Lost Weekend got a license from the Presidency on Askøy to sell alcohol from the 
kiosk on cite.  As a result, visitors to the festival had everything they needed within their 
immediate surroundings and had no reason to leave the festival area.  
 
 
Picture 16 Lost Weekend Camping in 2004, Before New Rules Were Enforced (Photo: Bergens Tidene 
http://www.bt.no/bergenpuls/Batforbud‐pa‐Lost‐Weekend‐1852400.html) 
 
The cleanup process in 2005 was excellent compared to previous years.  The camping 
visitors respected the items restrictions new of the year, and used the expanded recycling 
services.  During all hours of the festival some volunteers known as the Miljøpatruljen Green 
Team supervised and cleaned the camping area and each morning 10-15 people joined in to 
do the main cleaning.  Also the area around the stages was perfect, perhaps because of the 
deposit arrangement for plastic cups used in the bars (Bergens Tidene, 8.8.2005). 
One week after Lost Weekend 2005 the estimated surplus were on 300.000 NOK; 1, 5 
million below budget.  Johannessen believed that this was because of expensive bookings, 
security and the remediation of the garbage and cleanup process.  He also believed that 
because the on-site shop sold alcohol this year, the festival lost between 7-800.000 NOK. 
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Only 12.000 liters of beer were consumed at the concert area during the three days, something 
that is equivalent with approximately 0, 5 liters of beer per visitor (Askøyværingen b, 
12.8.2005). 
”I believe that we can sum this up as the following; we are good at arranging a party, 
but we are no economists” – Tom Johannessen  
The previous year’s volunteerism seemed to have faded because of the success Lost 
Weekend experienced in 2003 and 2004, perhaps because of separation between the regular 
volunteer and the closed circle the management had created where few members were 
allowed in.  According to Johannessen, 120 of a total of 190 people who helped arrange the 
festival in 2005 received payment (Askøyværingen b, 12.8.2005). 
By October 2005, it was clear that Lost Weekend was not able to pay their bills on 
140.000 NOK to the sound/light company used during the festival or the 115.000 NOK owed 
to the police for security services.  The Municipality of Askøy had guaranteed 200.000 NOK 
before the festival to cover deficits, and they were now forced to pay.  Apart from these two 
there were several other bills that were not paid as well (Askøyværingen, 7.10.2005).  
The Municipality of Askøy was uncertain of how they were going to handle Lost 
Weekend in coming years.  Their first concern was if the crisis was because of liquidity 
problems or simply messy accounting.  The Municipality agreed on the importance of Lost 
Weekend and praised the people behind the festival, but they needed a complete financial 
statement from the board if more money should be given to the festival (Bergensavisen, 
13.10.2005). 
Lost Weekend had by November clarified that they suffered a deficit on 1, 7 million 
NOK in 2005 and had began a dialogue with the 71 creditors which the festival owed money 
after the fifth year (letter to creditors 2005: see Appendix C).  Several actions were in 
progress to find a solution to the economical problems and the organization realized that they 
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needed help to professionalize Lost Weekend and controlling their economy.  One solution 
was to separate the administrative and the operational part of the organization.  The 
administrative part of Lost Weekend were registered as Lost AS in Brønnøysundregisteret and 
contained two representatives from Sparebanken Vest to help with the economical aspects, a 
volunteer who also worked as a consultant in Karabin Bergen were in charge of the 
organizational build of Lost Weekend, and one liaison from the volunteers from the 
operational part (Askøyværingen b, 13.12.2005).  
The administrative part of Lost Weekend (Lost AS) was created as a corporation 
because the festival was generating a high economic turnover. 50% of the shares would be 
kept by Lost Weekend, and 50% were put out for sale as people shares.  The market value of 
Lost Weekend was set at 5 million NOK, and the organization received 50% in B-shares at 
the real value (50 NOK x 1.000 shares = 50.000 NOK).  The people shares would be sold for 
a total value of 2, 5 million NOK, and would have a value of 1000 NOK per share.  The share 
capital would start at 100.000 NOK (Source: “Lost Weekend”, 2005). 
       
 People share 500.000 500 shares 10 %   
 Investors 500.000 500 shares 10 %   
 Converted 500.000 500 shares 10 %   
 KTV 1.000.000 1000 shares 20 %   
 
Lost 
Weekend 50.000 1000 shares 50 % (B-shares)  
 Sum 2.550.000        
       
Figure 10 A Preliminary Suggestion of the Distribution of Lost Weekend Shares 
 
Kenneth Nilsen from KTV was willing to pay the debt of Lost Weekend if the festival 
agreed on giving him economic control over the festival (Bergensavisen, 21.11.2005).  KTV 
would also buy 20% of the shares if they could be the only supplier of equipment and services 
to the festival (Source: “Lost Weekend”, 2005).  
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“I have offered Lost Weekend to take on their debt up to 1 million NOK if they let me 
co-arrange the festival.  This is something we know how to do.  A festival need people who 
know practical and economical solutions. It is not enough to be a gang of happy people who 
like music” – Kenneth Nilsen, leader KTV (ibergen.no, 4.11.2005) 
“We are continuing our work to secure a festival next year as well.  We have received 
communications with several investors who wish to help with the finances, but we also want 
to secure that the spirit of Lost Weekend is continued and we will be careful not to sell to too 
commercial actors” – Ronny Knudsen, leader of Lost AS 2005 (Askøyværingen, 23.12.2005) 
Lost Weekend asked the Municipality of Askøy to guarantee a bank loan on 2 million 
NOK before the festival in 2006 (Askøyværingen a, 13.12.2005) to cover their debt.  The 
application was denied because such support had to be taken from the budget of 2005, 
something that was difficult in December of 2005 (Askøyværingen, 23.12.2005). 
In 2005, the festival had a budget of 600.000 NOK in surplus, but ended with 1, 7 
million in debt instead.  Knudsen said that much money was spent on quick decision making 
instead of planned actions.  The festival also gave away close to 3.000 free tickets to sponsors 
and VIP’s; if they had been sold instead of given, the festival could have made 2.7000.000 
NOK (3000 free tickets x 900 NOK full price tickets = 2.700.000 NOK) (Askøyværingen, 
21.2.2006). 
Too many free tickets were not the only problem experienced finically by Lost 
Weekend in 2005.  Even though they sold for 500.000 NOK more than budged, the board did 
not follow any budget and bought whatever they thought necessary.  For instance 1 million 
NOK were spent on different goods needed at the festival, but this post was budgeted with 0 
NOK.  Booking expenses and payment to Posten/Billettservice also cost 500.000 NOK more 
than budget (Bergens Tidene, 16.1.2006).    
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Summary 2005.  In the year that went by from the festival in 2004 – 2005, Lost 
Weekend had several local organizations that had been founded by or were reliant on the 
festival. Tom Johannessen also won Kipekjerringa, Askøy’s culture award, both furthering the 
cultural and social capitals for Lost Weekend.  From this point, the cultural capital will be 
held as a constant variable in the model because Lost Weekend had a well established 
position in the community at Askøy and were a tradition for many Askøyværinger. 
The personal human capital for Johannessen in particular was strengthened by 
winning several awards over two years.  The validating effect the awards had together with 
the rising general popularity of the festival may have contributed to what was described 
within the organization as megalomania in board members.   
“For the media cruise in 2005, Lost Weekend borrowed the sailboat Statsraad 
Lehmkuhl to host it.  Mid sea, another boat approached Staatsraaden and it appeared that 
Lost Weekend had called in an order for 40 pizzas from Dolly Dimples to be delivered by a 
festival volunteer by boat.  The regatta was full of alcohol and other substances, with an 
extreme party factor.  A sponsor representative from Sparebanken Vest ended up with serious 
problems with his employer after too hard partying with Lost Weekend” – Volunteer 
comment 
 Social capital was not improved from last year because of comments like this, but it 
was only known within the festival’s volunteers and social capital was not further damaged in 
2005. 
Parts of the loss of financial capital experienced in 2005 were because of the usage of 
the festivals money on luxurious parties for a selected few, outside all budgeting.; the story of 
Statsraad Lehmkuhl was just one of many told the researcher during this study.  Lost 
Weekend tried too hard to be popular with sponsors as well.  By giving away almost 3.000 
The Rise and Fall of Lost Weekend: A case study  77 
free tickets the festival lost much expected income and combined with no budget control it 
was devastating for the festival. 
 
 
 
Their financial success from the two previous years was utterly destroyed after this 
year’s festival.  Some of the reasons for the loss in financial capital were mentioned above, 
but others were the booking of bands which all were the great Norwegian bands in 2005 and 
who should be out of the price range of such a young festival.  Also the expansions of the area 
as well as the stages were a reason.  Several stages demand more bands, equipment and 
hospitality costs.  A volunteer commented the following in the open comment field of the 
survey, supporting this belief: 
“The main reason why Lost Weekend was discontinued was because of too much 
money were spent on artists from 2004 – 2007 compared to the generated income.  In 
addition, the festival simply grew too big”- Volunteer comment on why Lost Weekend failed 
The creation of Lost AS was an attempt to rectify the extreme deficit, which was the 
first amongst many attempts.  
Figure 11 Capitals 2005 
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“We wanted to either create an AS who would run the festival or create a sub-
company who owned the equipment needed to create the festival, and who the festival would 
rent from.  The share company was never put into action because Lost Weekend did not own 
any values and we were advised to wait until we did.  Neither did the sub-company”- Øyvind 
Tumyr, coming media liaison Lost Weekend   
Both these ideas were creative suggestions to help Lost Weekend out of their troubles. 
Even though no shares were ever sold, Lost AS were used to name the administrative part. 
KTV tried to buy much of the debt of Lost Weekend in exchange for the festival using 
him as a sole supplier of services.  The researcher personal experience of the mood at that 
point inside Lost Weekend were that if they did let KTV pay their debt, Lost Weekend would 
be selling not only the festival but also the spirit of the festival.  In the end Lost Weekend did 
agree on letting KTV be their main supplier for 2006. 
Because of the improvement of physical capital of Lost Weekend in 2004– 2005; all 
necessary equipment and expansions of the area was in place from those years and this 
variable will also be held constant from 2005.  The only differences in physical capital in the 
years from 2005 were in regards to number of stages and the on-site kiosk.  These aspects will 
not be seen as a influence on the general physical capital, as issues with BOF will be analyzed 
as an administrative capital. 
Year 6: Lost Weekend 2006 
 
”We had no control.  We thought last summer that we had millions in surplus when we 
flew Lisa Ekdahl from Sweden to play at a seminar we arranged for 100 volunteers at Hotel 
Admiral in Bergen.  The one seminar cost us 180.000 NOK.  Afterwards when we understood 
what we had done, with a debt on 1, 7 million NOK and 71 creditors, it was a feeling of 
shock.  But we told each other that we could turn this around too. And we are going to “– 
Eirik Minde & Tom Johannessen, interview with Bergenpuls (Bergens Tidene, 17.3.2006) 
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Lost AS sent a letter to all creditors at the end of 2005 (see Appendix C), and the 
response were that all creditors were willing to wait to get paid until after the festival in 2006.  
Lost Weekends main goal for 2006 was to pay all creditors as soon as possible 
(Askøyværingen, 10.1.2006). 
“The creditors were really nice.  They showed patience and that made our job much 
easier” – Ronny Knudsen, leader of Lost AS 2006  
 The Municipality of Askøy received another application for a deficit guaranty on 
200.000 NOK from Lost Weekend.  The Municipality had not taken that amount into account 
when they created this year’s budget, but explained that if Lost Weekend managed to pay all 
their creditors without releasing the guaranty on 200.000 NOK given in 2005, the money 
could be transferred to 2006 (Bergens Tidene, 8.2.2006).  The Communal council of 
Hordaland in the end took the guaranty decision out of the hands of the Municipality of 
Askøy and released the 200.000 NOK promised to Lost Weekend to pay the Police and 
AVAB-CAC (sound and light) (Bergensavisen, 16.5.2006).  This decision to not guaranty 
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Lost Weekend 200.000 NOK for 2006 made by the Municipality of Askøy was perceived as a 
betrayal by Lost Weekend (Askøyværingen, 21.2.2006). 
Financial trouble was not the only problems Lost Weekend experienced in 2006.  In 
June, Lost Weekend were shocked after four parents sent a letter to 40 mail addresses 
including media, police, and sponsors, where they accused some of the key persons from the 
organization of extensive drug sales to save the financial situation of Lost Weekend 
(Bergensavisen, 30.6.2006).  
“We are two pairs of parents in the age between 35-50 years, and we have children in 
the age group 4-19.  We cannot stand idly by anymore and watch members of the Lost 
Weekend board continuing with an extensive sale of drugs…  As far as we understand they 
have through their contacts in the Norwegian and international music environment gained 
access to large amounts of drugs, which they sold for a profit.  This is supposed to have 
carried on for some time” – anonymous letter from parents (Bergensavisen, 30.6.2006) 
Lost Weekend immediately responded through the media that they had never been 
involved with drug trafficking, and no one in the board knew anything about such operations.  
They considered pressing charges against the senders of the letter for slander.  However, 
rumors had been circulating at Askøy about economical infidelity and drug use, and the board 
decided to answer the E-mail accusations to clarify these points.  Lost Weekend received 
much support from the local community after the E-mail was published and it seemed to the 
board that the case rekindled a level of involvement in the community (Askøyværingen, 
5.7.2006).   
  By the end of July of 2006, Tom Johannessen involuntary had to leave the Lost 
Weekend board.  In the media, this seemed as a wish from Johannessen, but in an interview, 
Ståle Haugland could reveal that he was in fact forced out of the board.  Lost Weekend had 
called a board meeting to discuss the current situation the festival were in, where Johannessen 
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did not show or gave any explanation of why he did not come.  The board then saw no other 
choice than to “fire” him.  Lost Weekend sent a press statement to the media, explaining 
Johannessen’s motivations for leaving the organization (see Appendix D).  
“It felt so bad.  I think it must have been worse than a divorce.  Lost Weekend had 
been my life for so many years” – Tom Johannessen 
  This year private businesses were for the first time involved in the festival to secure 
enough resources for the arrangement (Askøyværingen, 21.3.2006), and collaboration with 
KTV and Security Vest were made.  While Lost Weekend had creative control, these two 
companies were responsible for executing the festival in a responsible way (Askøyværingen, 
19.7.2006).  Lost Weekend was also seeking volunteers who could work as guards to counter 
the effect of the professional guards.  The festival needed volunteers to be the visible face of 
Lost Weekend to keep the spirit of the festival, while the police and professional security 
guards were available to step in if a situation arose.  As before, they had younger volunteers 
working all days with the stages, hospitality, and cleaning, but needed adults to create the 
visible frame of the festival. 
 
 
Picture 17 Volunteer at Lost Weekend (Photo: Dag Thorvaldsen) 
The Rise and Fall of Lost Weekend: A case study  82 
”The grownups created a comfortable mood.  The youth was happy they had some 
adults to talk to” – Mona Christiansen, volunteer manager Lost Weekend 2007 
Lost Weekend 2006 featured for the first time its own festival newspaper with 
information about bands, the now four stages; Lost Club, Lost Beach, Lost Minor, and Lost 
Major, maps over the area with important locations marked, and information about sponsors. 
The previous years, Lost Minor was called Lillescenen and Lost Major was Storescenen 
(“Lost Weekend festival newspaper”, 2006). 
Lost Weekend had a total surplus of 700.000 NOK after the festival in 2006, but they 
still owed about 1 million NOK to different creditors (Askøyværingen, 24.11.2006).  
Summary 2006.  The departure of Johannessen from the Lost Weekend board before 
the festival in 2006 were perhaps the only correct action the organization could execute after 
all the negative media coverage and the dissatisfaction from volunteers in the organization.  
When Johannessen left Lost Weekend it damaged both the social and human capitals of Lost 
Weekend since he had been the ‘face’ and identity of the festival up to now.  The reason why 
human capital was not further damaged was that even though Johannessen left Lost Weekend, 
new people with different motivations entered the organization.  The change in human capital 
resulted in the focus of Lost Weekend changing from a “Woodstock” to a business view. 
 Even though the E-mail from “concerned parents” was highly exaggerated, Lost 
Weekend did finance the partying of some members of the board and a selected few 
volunteers.  The only way to counter the growing suspicions externally and dissatisfaction 
internally was to eliminate the perceived problem from the organization.  Johannessen later on 
decided to leave Askøy and relocate to another city.   
In conversations with several individuals from Askøy while writing this thesis, many 
expressed opinions that Johannessen had taken all the blame of many involved in the 
organization who had knowingly and actively participated in the spending of the festivals 
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finances.  Johannessen himself told the researcher that he to this day feels isolated from the 
community on Askøy after he quit Lost Weekend because of different accusations and the 
distribution of blame for the failure in 2005.  Johannessen has still not reconnected with the 
Askøy society, and only sees his old friends when they call him or visit his current location. 
 
 
  
The collaboration with KTV and Security Vest did perhaps professionalize the festival 
in some physical regards, but it also lost some of the innocence and enthusiasm that was the 
binding effect of Lost Weekend and contributed to a loss in human and social capital.  
Security Vest replaced many of the volunteer adults that had been visible by night before with 
security guards dressed in black and wearing bulletproof vests, which resulted in many of the 
guests and volunteers becoming apprehensive of the new regime. 
“They were scary.  We were used to seeing our own or others family members 
interacting with us as guards.  Suddenly there was a big man dressed in black who shone a 
flashlight in your eyes when you simply just walked by.  If we felt that way, how do you think 
the visitors felt?” – Volunteer comment on why Lost Weekend failed 
Figure 12 Capitals 2006 
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2006 was supposed to correct for the extremely difficult financial situation Lost 
Weekend experienced in 2005.  Unfortunately the accumulated debt could not be paid, and 
the festival continued to struggle with their financial capital.  A positive sign for Lost 
Weekend was that the creditors were willing to postpone payment on money owed, which  
may indicate a strong network as well as goodwill towards the festival from the community, 
and is why social capital is not displayed as more critical. There was also a good connection 
to the administrative capital in 2006; even Lost Weekend thought the Municipality of Askøy 
betrayed them for not releasing the 200.000 NOK before the debt was paid.   
Year 7: Lost Weekend 2007 
 
“High economical costs and star-sickness struck festival-Norway this year.  Ambitions 
of costly international headliners in combination with an unrealistic view of the local visitor 
basis led to messages ticking inn about festival death and serious illness from several places: 
Snoop Dogg overturned Hell Music Festival in Trøndelag.  Idyllic Lost Weekend on Askøy 
outside of Bergen were not able to promote their deliciously put together program with 
Flaming Lips as the headliner, and cannot afford to pay their employees” – Sven Ove Bakke, 
music critic (28.8.2007 – Dagbladet). 
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According to Lennart Fjell (UiB), Lost Weekend was a classic example of a festival 
which grew too large for the enthusiasts who created it.  As the festival grew, the workload 
increased, and so did the need for special competencies.  His impression of Lost Weekend 
was that they might understand that they needed help but that it might be difficult to ask for it.   
Fjell was in 2007 doing his Doctorial on festivals where he especially focused on the 
connection between ideology and management (Bergens Tidene, 10.7.2007). 
 “The Lost Weekend organization has strong feelings for their festival.  Commercial 
forces represent a counterpart to their environment and ideology, and they fear that the 
festival may lose its identity” – Lennart Fjell, 2007 
The collected debt of Lost Weekend was before the festival in 2007 about 1, 5 million 
NOK.  The increase in debt was mainly because of numerous creditors and their accumulated 
interests.  Most of this debt had been with the festival since 2005, but they had managed to 
reduce the debt with 600.000 NOK thanks to the positive income last year (Askøyværingen, 
2.5.2007). 
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”Old debt was inhibitory.  Our highest priority lied in handling the economical aspect, 
which was important for Lost Weekend. We wanted a predictable economy.  Our problem was 
that the debt was spread out between many creditors” – Ronny Knudsen, leader of Lost AS 
2007 
By June 2007 Lost Weekend had 48 creditors which they owed a total of 1.667.883 
NOK (Askøyværingen b, 22.6.2007).  Lost Weekend creditors were in the end given three 
choices by Lost AS; waive their debt partially or completely, commit to a long-term down 
payment plan, or let the festival file for bankruptcy which would lead to closure.  The result 
for either of the solutions would lead to financial losses for the creditors12 (For letter to 
creditors 2007, see Appendix E) (Askøyværingen a, 22.6.2007).  Of the remaining 48 
creditors, 47 gave the festival positive feedback after their plea for debt relief 
(Askøyværingen, 5.7.2007).  The one who did not want to waive the debt was Lost Weekends 
former co-arranger KTV, but KTV were in the end forced to waive the debt in the end 
because of pressure from other creditors (Bergensavisen, 2.8.2007).  
Surprisingly, KTV originally wanted to repeat the collaboration from last year, but in 
Lost Weekends opinion KTV made an unfair deal with the previous board; a deal which 
resulted in KTV receiving about 2 millions of the ticket sales from 2006.  KTV claimed that it 
was unfair of Lost Weekend to break of f the deal, because KTV’s expenses for tents, fences, 
power, stages, sound, light, and security accumulated to 1, 8 million NOK in total.  This had 
left KTV with a surplus of only 200.000 NOK, which KTV had not received from Lost 
Weekend 2006 (Bergens Tidene, 6.6.2007). 
 There were several organizational changes in Lost Weekend in 2007.  In March, Ståle 
Haugland (booking) and Ronny Knudsen (administrative) were given a joint 75% position in 
Lost Weekend.  Eirik Minde quit his position as festival leader in June, and Kjell Lisund (45), 
                                                 
12 Creditors had to waive 60% of the debt, which would allow Lost Weekend to reduce their debt with 1 million 
NOK. 
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a previous transportation volunteer was chosen as the new leader for Lost Weekend (Bergens 
Tidene, 6.6.2007).  One stage at the area (Lost Club) was cancelled because of low interest 
form visitors, while Lost Beach with its natural amphitheatre in the grass grew in size 
(Askøyværingen, 30.5.2007). 
About 9.000 visited Lost Weekend in 2007, which was 20-25 % less than expected 
and the festival ended on a deficit of 1, 1 – 1, 3 million.  The Lost Weekend board thought 
that from an administrative perspective this was the best festival so far (Bergensavisen b, 
6.8.2007).  Lisund said that all cost saving processes had worked according to their plan, but 
that the low number of visitors had resulted in loss of ticket and alcohol income 
(Bergensavisen, 23.8.2007).  After the deficit of Lost Weekend 2007, Lisund dissolved 
positions held by both Haugland and Knudsen (Bergensavisen, 23.8.2007) and assumed the 
role as leader for Lost AS himself.  The result of this was that the last of the founders of Lost 
Weekend left the board.  
Åge Roses (SV) promised Lost Weekend that he would do everything in his power to 
help the festival survive and develop.  He believed that the festival created a good image for 
Askøy as a location, and that politicians should help with whatever the festival needed 
(Askøyværingen, 6.9.2007). 
“The festival has suffered deficits.  Sometimes it is not enough with optimism and 
motivation.  Economic control is needed here, as all festivals need.  The deficit has grown and 
the entrepreneurs need support…  Lost Weekend has a positive effect on the community of 
Askøy, and it is especially positive that youth is engaged in the project. If it is financial 
backup they need, we will see what we can do.  If it is expertise they need, we have to supply 
it” – Åge Rosnes, Sosialistisk Venstreparti (Askøyværingen, 6.9.2007) 
The Municipality of Askøy had in 2007 improved their economical situation, and Lost 
Weekend secured for the first time a post in their budgets for 2008 with 75.000 NOK 
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(Bergens Tidene, 23.11.2006).  The Communal counsel of Hordaland also assigned 200.000 
NOK of their cultural budget to Lost Weekend in 2008.  This was seen by Lost Weekend as a 
validation of their position in the culture scene (Askøyværingen, 24.11.2006).  
Summary 2007.   Since the deficit in 2005, Lost Weekend struggled with a growing 
amount of debt.  Based solely on the goodwill from creditors, the festival was able to continue 
production.  The fact that the creditors were willing to waive 60% of Lost Weekends debt 
demonstrated a willingness to sustain the festival in the community.  Support from creditors 
was the only reason why Lost Weekend did not have a worse outcome in social capital.  
Support from the Municipality was also strongly present which kept the administrative capital 
stable, even though Lost Weekend had not been grateful for the help given the previous year.  
Both private and public instances displayed motivations of keeping the festival. 
 
 
 
Attempts were made to downscale the festival in number of stages, but the booking 
expenses this year were extremely high with many international headliners.  Unfortunately, 
the program was not well suited for the general festival visitor because though they were great 
bands musically speaking, they were relatively unknown for a number of the base visitors.   
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Figure 13 Capitals 2007 
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Many visiting Lost Weekend were not as musically experienced as the booking group; 
something that created a discrepancy between the motivations of the booking group and the 
needs of the audience.  
 Human capital was lowered in 2007 because Lost Weekend as an organization did not 
have a strong organization with clear motivations and goals.  As a result of internal struggles 
surrounding the goals and further development of the festival, Minde and Haugland both quit 
the organization in 2007 and the festival lost its two remaining original board members. 
“Some wanted to go back to the way we were, while some wanted to change the whole 
festival.  I did not want to be a part of this “new” organization because it did not feel right 
anymore” – Ståle Haugland 
“Lost Weekend did not manage to choose what the festival should be, and was stuck 
between several solutions.  Each of the suggestions could probably function separately, but in 
effect the festival became a poor compromise which did not stand a chance against the strain 
of the problems.  Also the backing was too poor and because of that the enthusiasts became 
burnt out before new could step into their place” – Staff comment on why Lost Weekend 
failed 
Year 8: Lost Weekend 2008 
 
The first open Annual Meeting of Lost Weekend was held in January 2008 where 43 
people showed to learn about the future of Lost Weekend.  The ones who were present at the 
meeting were accepted as members, could vote for regulations in the organization, and new 
board members.  The Annual Meeting of Lost Weekend showed that the festival had an 
accumulated deficit of 3, 3 million NOK by 2008.  Hantveit Førgaard , which were elected as 
Lost Weekend festival manager 2008, claimed that this year no big international bands would 
be playing at the festival because the price were too high compared to what the festival 
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generated in return (Bergensavisen, 31.1.2008).  This was later proved to be wrong, since 
several Norwegian headliners played together with the Waterboys (UK/Irl). 
 
 
 
The Municipality of Askøy agreed on giving Lost Weekend a total of 1 million NOK 
spread out over two years, the first 500.000 NOK given in 2008 (Askøyværingen, 17.1.2008).  
Lost Weekend was because of that able to pay suppliers 25% of the total price on equipment 
and goods when they made agreements before the festival in 2008 (Bergensavisen, 
31.1.2008).  There was however a catch with the money given from the Municipality; it could 
only be spent on the production of the festival in 2008 and not to pay debt or interests from 
previous years.   
Lennart Fjell, which in 2007 had been interviewed by Bergens Tidene on his opinion 
of Lost Weekend, came to Lost Weekend to study the visitors and their opinions of Lost 
Weekend.  Some of his findings included that 2/3 of the 274 respondents had attended the 
festival more than three times, and that these were mainly aged from 25 years and up.  He also 
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found that Lost Weekend heightened the general self esteem of the local community, and that 
Askøy now was known because of Lost Weekend.  According to Fjell, he discovered 
statements such as;  
“I’m from Askøy, not Bergen.  Statements like this are not uncommon after Lost 
Weekend placed Askøy and Kollevåg on the map”…. “… Placed Askøy on the map.  Now 
even people from Oslo where the island is at”…. “The festival places Askøy on the map in a 
more extensive way than most people know, and creates an important identity for the youth”. 
Fjell also discovered that the visitors had difficulties separating the musical aspect 
from the social aspect, and that Lost Weekend was used as a means to communicate with 
visitor’s local community.  The music often came second to a social aspect in the survey, but 
had a function as content and gathering point for people with the same taste in music 
(http://www.festivalresearch.com/LW%20rapport%20web.htm). 
The Municipality of Askøy had gathered information from surveys other festivals had 
conducted, where they estimated how much value an established music festival generates in 
the local community.  In the case of Lost Weekend, the total revenue in the community would 
be 14 million NOK if Lost Weekend managed their budget of 3, 5 million NOK in ticket sales 
(Bergens Tidene b, 31.7.2008). 
”The politicians on Askøy see the support to Lost Weekends as well spent money, also 
because of the direct economical value the festival generates “ – Bård Sandal, business 
manager Municipality of Askøy 
The total number of sold tickets were 6.500 in 2008 with a profit on about 250.000 
NOK.  Hantveit believed that this year the low numbers were because their marketing process 
started too late; not before 31.May.  Lost Weekend had budgeted to pay all debt after this 
year’s fetsival but because of the low visitor numbers only parts of it could be payed 
(Bergensavisen, 6.8.2008).  As a result, Lisund sent a mail to the creditors after the festival, 
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where he wrote that Lost Weekend would call a new Annual Meeting with the orgainzation to 
discontinue the festival (Bergensavisen, 23.10.2008).  
“We worked with an extremely bad startingpoint and this placed too much strain on 
the commitment internally in the organization” - Kjell Lisund, leader Lost AS 
Lost AS did not think that the basis for fututre festivals were present after 2008, even 
though the members of the board were willing to take personal bank loans on a total of 
500.000 NOK.  The banks would however not grant them lones because of low security, 
especially because of the restrictions given from Municipality of Askøy on the money 
sponsored by them (Bergensavisen, 23.10.2008). 
“Because Lost Weekend was not allowed to use the capital provided from the 
Municipality in 2009 to pay debt or interests, we saw no other solution but to discontinue the 
festival” – Kjell Lisund, leader Lost AS 2008 
Lisund argued that if the financial support given to the festival by the Municipality 
could be used to pay the debt, the festival would be a healthy festival which generated enough 
to survive, but that it was impossible to create a festival with debt from several years ago 
continuing to follow the festival (Askøyværingen, 21.11.2008, modified 5.8.2009).  The board 
of Lost Weekend did try to rectify the economical situation of the festival, but found no 
solution on how to pay all their debt even though it was reduced to 800.000 NOK (Bergens 
Tidene, 23.10.2008).  
“We were very sad, but at the same time a bit relieved…  We had been optimistic the 
whole way, but then we realized that we could not do this anymore…  We wanted to create 
something that happened on Askøy.  We wanted to give local artists a big stage to perform on.  
We did manage that for eight years at least” – Lillianne Hanveit Førgaard, festival manager 
Lost Weekend 2008 
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“This process has been a huge organizational strain.  An unpaid and extremely time 
consuming climb uphill can prey on the forces of even the most involved in the festival…  You 
begin to wonder when everyone tell you that what you are doing is wrong, while you feel like 
you are accomplishing something” – Kjell Lisund, leader Lost AS 2008 (Askøyværingen, 
29.12.2008).   
Different musicians from Askøy reacted with disappointment when they heard that 
Lost Weekend would be discontinued.  They believed that the closure of Lost Weekend 
would injure the musical development on Askøy (Askøyværingen, 28.10.2008). 
“Unbelievable sad for all those who have worked so hard for this festival…  The 
festival creates something with substance.  It is not just another concert at Loftet” – Even 
“Magnet” Johansen, Askøyværing (Askøyværingen, 28.10.2008) 
“This is so lame.  Now something is missing.  This was something that was nice and 
good for the island.  It was something the bands looked on as an inspirational carrot and a 
professional thing with many possibilities” – Thomas Lønnheim, drummer in Ralph Myers 
and the Jack Herren Band and Askøyværing (Askøyværingen, 28.10.2008) 
The politicians of Askøy had different opinions of the future of Lost Weekend after it 
was known that the festival would probably be forced to close after 2008.  While FrP refused 
to grant Lost Weekend an interest free loan, and Høyre did not want to promise the festival 
any more financial support,  AP and SV thought that Lost Weekend were still a project which 
should receive Communal support (Askøyværingen, 12.8.2008, modified 5.8.2009). 
“We must have politicians who see the value of the festival.  Lost Weekend has placed 
Askøy on the map of Norway – when I travel around and visit friends and acquaintances, they 
know what Lost Weekend is” – Åge Rosnes, SV (Askøyværingen, 12.8.2008, modified 
5.8.2009) 
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The former collaborators with Lost Weekend, KTV, told media at this point that they 
wanted to arrange a festival in Kollevåg if Lost Weekend had to close.  BOF, however, 
refused to allow any other actors’ access to the area at that time; in fear of all the problems 
they experienced with the cleaning process the first years of Lost Weekend would be 
repeated.  A representative from BOF said that the only reason why they had allowed Lost 
Weekend to be arranged there at all were because of the strong support from the Municipality 
of Askøy (Bergensavisen, 15.11.2008).  The Municipality of Askøy said that would keep the 
500.000 NOK promised to Lost Weekend in 2009 in their budgets in case the festival found a 
solution or if someone else wanted to create a festival on Askøy, but that they would not 
support a commercial actor (Askøyværingen, 28.11.2008).  
The one thing that saved Lost Weekend from closing in 2008 was Skatt Vest who 
reduced their tax claim from Lost Weekend with 75% in December of 2008.  This action 
reduced Lost Weekend’s debt owed the public from 280.000 to 55.000 NOK.  In 2007 the 
private creditors agreed on the same debt restructuring, and the total debt of Lost Weekend 
had been lowered to something manageable (Askøyværingen, 29.12.2008).   
Summary 2008.  Once again Lost Weekend dodged the threat of closure because of 
administrative capital through Communal support and tax relief from national instances.  The 
support was not enough to raise the financial capital of Lost Weekend from critical but made 
it possible to arrange another year.  
It appeared that several of the prominent members of both Lost AS and Lost Weekend 
thought that the strain of financial chaos the last three years had ruined some of the joy of 
arranging the festival, which resulted in a further loss of human capital.  It seems from the 
statements from both Hantveit and Lisund that they were tired of defending the festival 
internally and externally, but the commitment of the community was still strong.  Because of 
the commitment from the community, social capital was not as weak as it could have been.  
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As Fjell discovered, the festival had created an identity felt by everyone from high 
ranking politicians to the average Askøyværing, and thus supporting that cultural capital was 
held as a constant variable.  The feeling of identity and pride in the festival may be a cause for 
the strong involvement from the Municipality of Askøy over several years.  The Municipality 
and BOF also closed the door for commercial actors such as KTV, and would not let them 
arrange a festival based on profit in Kollevågen.  
 
 
 
The Municipality could not promise to cover the debt of Lost Weekend and would not 
let the festival spend the given financial support on down payment of debt. This was once 
again seen as a lack of Communal support by Lost Weekend, even though the Municipality of 
Askøy did grant Lost Weekend 500.000 NOK in support. 
Year 9: Lost Weekend 2009 
 
BOF refused Lost Weekend to rent Kollevåg early in 2009 because of the long time 
used to clean the area after the festival ended in 2008, and because Lost Weekend had not 
paid 35.000 NOK in rent they owed from 2008.  After the solution with Skatt Vest in 
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December, the deputy Mayor of Askøy assisted Lost Weekend in opening a dialogue with 
BOF so that the festival could be arranged (Askøyværingen b, 6.2.2009).  BOF let Lost 
Weekend rent Kollevåg because of pressure from the Municipality of Askøy (Askøyværingen 
a, 6.2.2009). 
“Now we have to focus on the positive.  The festival management can continue with 
their work.  I am looking forward to the arrangement in Kollevågen” – Siv Høgtun, deputy 
Mayor of Askøy, 2009 (Askøyværingen a, 6.2.2009) 
 
 
 
Hansa Borg was Lost Weekend’s largest creditor by the beginning of 2009; the 
festival owed them about 500.000 NOK.  Hansa and the other creditors who agreed on the 
debt restructuring were one reason why Lost Weekend could be arranged in 2009 
(Bergensavisen, 3.1.2009). 
“The debt is reduced to 700.000 NOK.  We have negotiated a payment deferral on two 
years with most of our creditors.  We are also waiting for fresh money from the Municipality 
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and Norsk Kulturråd.  The economy is better than it has been in years” – Kjell Lisund, leader 
Lost AS 2009 (Bergensavisen, 3.1.2009) 
“The mess (economic) was from a long time ago, but we always wanted to straighten 
out our debt.  We tried to cut costs in a variety of areas” – Øyvind Tumyr, media manager 
Lost Weekend  
Hantveit quit her role as festival manager after just one year because of personal 
reasons.  Instead of replacing her with a new festival manager the booking group would share 
the role and Øyvind Tumyr would be the spoke person to the media (Askøyværingen, 
3.3.2009).  Lost Weekend attempted new ways of recruiting volunteers this year.  By using 
the social media Facebook to promote the festival and recruited volunteers, they ended with 
300 – 400 volunteers involved in Lost Weekend 2009, where everyone from doctors to tickets 
sellers worked for free (Bergensavisen, 5.8.2009). 
 “This is our baby.  We have a good crew who has been here for years. It is fun to 
build a festival.  To rig the stage is just like playing with Lego” – Kristian Pedersen, volunteer 
(Bergens Tidene, 5.8.2009) 
“Everyone is here of their own free will, so of course there is a great mood.  We are 
dependent on the fact that the volunteers are happy, because if not, they will not come” – 
Eirik Andersen, area manager (Bergens Tidene, 5.8.2009) 
Several of the volunteers at Lost Weekend fell sick after the festival ended; they were 
overworked with little sleep in the days before, during and after the festival.  The media 
manager of Lost Weekend, Øyvind Tumyr explained that the responsibilities of each group 
had not been correctly divided on the volunteers, and that some volunteers had too much 
responsibility (Askøyværingen, 13.8.2009). 
Lost Weekend sold 5.856 tickets during the festival in 2009.  Their budget was on 
2.000 tickets (18.8.2009 – Askøyværingen), and positive income were on about 500.000 
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NOK.  Tumyr stated that before the festival in 2009, Lost Weekend had close to 750.000 
NOK in debt but with the surplus they were now down to 250.000 NOK.  He hoped that this 
trend would continue so that they next year could do as their original vision described; to be 
able to give help to the musical environment on Askøy (Askøyværingen, 20.11.2009). 
Summary 2009.  The general mood in the organization was improved in 2009, after 
the low organizational feeling from previous years, which led to an improvement in human 
and social capitals.  Perhaps this was because of the improvement in the financial capital 
compared to previous years or that the organizational turmoil from 2006 - 2007 had started to 
calm down. The internal reorganizing which had resulted in several long time members 
leaving the Lost Weekend had let new people into the organization with fresh enthusiasm, 
something the festival may have needed.  As the years after 2005 - 2006, the main focus of 
the media in 2009 was on the financial situation of Lost Weekend, disregarding the 
entrepreneurship and enthusiasm which had characterized the first four years.  
 
 
 
Creditors of Lost Weekend were still positive to the festival and agreed on 
restructuring debt once again.  The Municipality of Askøy, who proved several times over the 
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years that they understood the importance of the festival, not only pressured BOF into 
allowing Lost Weekend access to Kollevågen once again, they also gave the festival 500.000 
NOK as promised from last year.  Because of this the administrative capital was still strong in 
2009. 
Year 10: Lost Weekend 2010 
 
Lost weekend down scaled the festival in an attempt to create a viable festival.  While 
2010 featured a good program, it was also safe in regards to bands and popularity.  
 
 
 
We come year after year primarily for the festival feeling…  We are going to attend 
some concerts, but actually it is not the music that draws us here.  We believe hanging out at 
the camp with good friends is at least as important” – Visitors at Lost Weekend 
(Askøyværingen, 5.8.2010). 
“It is important that we have good artists on the stage, but I believe that people just as 
much focus on Lost Weekend as a gathering point.  The weekend will be a social happening” 
– Øyvind Tumyr, media manager Lost Weekend (Askøyværingen, 5.8.2010). 
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Lost Weekend did not receive financial support from the Municipality of Askøy in 
2010, like they did the previous years (Askøyværingen, 21.7.2010).  This was seen as 
problematic by Lost Weekend since they for years had struggled to keep the festival running, 
mainly by support from the Municipality of Askøy. 
Even though Lost Weekend met their budget on 5.800 sold tickets, the same number 
as they sold last year, they had a deficit on about 500.000 NOK after the festival in 2010.  
Along with this, Lost Weekend owed Skatt Vest about 500.000 NOK in value added tax from 
2007 – 2010; money the festival did not have.  Lisund told Askøyværingen that this money 
was owed on the basis of faulty information given orally from Skatt Vest in 2007, because 
Lost Weekend had thought that they did not have to pay VAT (17.12.2010 – Askøyværingen).  
Bands who played at the festival also complained to the festival over not receiving their fees 
after the festival in 2010.  The Mayor of Askøy told Askøyværingen that they could not 
become directly involved in the case with Skatt Vest, but gave them access to the legal 
department of the Municipality (Askøyværingen, 21.12.2010). 
“After the lawyers have looked at the case, we will see if Skatt Vest is willing to waive 
their claim.  It is not in the State’s interest to stop Lost Weekend” – Roald Stenseide, FrP 
(Askøyværingen, 21.12.2010) 
The local newspaper Askøyværingen, who had been loyal to the festival through all 
their problems in previous years, now hinted that Lost Weekend should be discontinued.  This 
was because of all the other volunteer organizations, such as Folkehjelpen, Nordsiden IL and 
Trææt Skolekorps that had helped Lost Weekend to arrange the festival in 2010, now 
struggled financially as well because of the resources they had spent on the festival 
(Askøyværingen, 17.12.2010). 
 “We had huge internal discussions about what we wanted and what the festival 
should be.  There is no point in hiding that several just want to discontinue the festival, while 
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others want to continue.  Others again want to return the festival to its original form when it 
was a small thing for our self, a few visitors and without the huge financial amounts needed to 
run it.  Then we would be back to the original philosophy, with fewer stages and mainly local 
bands” – Kjell Lisund, leader Lost AS, 2010 
After the 10 year anniversary of Lost Weekend it was clear that the festival would not 
be arranged in 2011.  The reasons given from the Lost Weekend board were the present 
economical situation, but also the strain five years of financial chaos had inflicted on the 
festival. 
 
 
Picture 18 Volunteers at Lost Weekend 2010 on the Lost Beach Stage While the Audience Sang "Happy Birthday" (Photo: 
Anne Jo Lexander) 
 
Summary 2010.  Little written information could be found about Lost Weekend 
2010, but the general mood both internally in the organization and externally in the media was 
that everybody was tired of the financial chaos which had been the most prominent feature 
since 2005.  The only reason why the festival had survived for such a long time was the 
goodwill from the Municipality of Askøy, creditors and the support from the local 
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community.  Because of negative comments from different instances in the local community 
Lost Weekend experienced a loss in social capital.  
In 2010 the Municipality decided not to financially support Lost Weekend like they 
had the previous years, which led to a decline of administrative capital even though the 
Municipality did continue to grant Lost Weekend access to their supportive systems.  
 
 
 
Unforeseen VAT owed Skatt Vest combined with previous debt finally forced Lost 
Weekend to discontinue, which is why there is a loss of financial capital.  
In conversations with several volunteers from Askøy, the researcher discovered that 
2010 was the first time in years they had the same feeling of community and idealism as they 
had experienced the first years of Lost Weekend.  This influenced the human capital during 
the festival.  It was probably an effect from the festival in 2009 and during the festival in 
2010; human and social capitals were present.  After the festival in 2010, the claim of VAT 
was delivered which resulted in a loss of human and social capital.  These capitals were 
because of that marked as yellow in Figure 16.   
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 It was not only the board’s decision on discontinuing the festival, but also the 
committed volunteers who had been involved.  The festival had run its course both emotional 
and physical for the individuals who had invested much in Lost Weekend over many years 
“It was a worthy closure for Lost Weekend.  We managed ten years, and even though 
it was sad to say goodbye to something that had been the only vacation I had each summer 
the last ten years, it was also good to experience the same mood as the first years after so 
long” – Volunteer comment 
Findings from survey 
 
To finalize findings from Lost Weekend, some results from the survey will here be 
presented to give an indication of volunteers and leaders own perception of why Lost 
Weekend failed.  
 Responses were given from a total of 32 individuals, 15 from the Staff group and 17 
from the volunteer group.  This may be a low number of respondents, but the criteria set for 
participation was that they had been involved in Lost Weekend for a minimum of five years.  
That criteria was set because they were asked why they thought the festival failed, and to 
answer that question participants needed to have an above average knowledge about the 
organization and they had to experience the festival over several years.  The researcher’s 
perceived importance of empirical experience to answer the question asked in the survey was 
based on the multiple internal changes that were done in the organization across a ten years 
span and the respondent’s connection to Lost Weekend. 
 The respondents answered either “not a reason”, “a possible reason”, “a clear reason” 
or “do not know” for why Lost Weekend failed.  They also had the possibility to compose 
their own answers to all questions.  Some of the free text answers have been presented during 
the summaries of each year and some will be presented in this section. 
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Figure 17 Spread of Years Participated on Lost Weekend as a Volunteer or Staff 
 
 Results from the survey will here be presented as equalities or differences between 
answers given from volunteers and staff/leaders.  Only the answers that were registered as a 
possible or clear cause for failure will be presented.  The survey was divided into six 
categories:  Marketing/promotion, external influence, human resources, financial resources, 
organizational culture, and media relations (for full figures of answers, see Appendix F). 
Marketing/promotion.  Volunteers experienced the festival’s program as not fittet 
to the audience and that it was too similar each year.  The Staff agreed on the opinon of the 
program as unfittet to the audience, but thought that there were changes from year to year.  
Both group agree on that a possible reason for  failure were that Lost Weekend developed a 
poor image during the years (Clear: Staff 46, 7%, Volunteers 41, 2%) and that the festival did 
not display economical benefits sponsors could obtain by the festival. 
“A bad economical reputation damaged the total impression of the fetsival, and 
created a negativ image of the festival.  The fact that we had to save money all the time also 
lead to a strengthened negative effect for visitors and amongst some volunteers” – Staff 
comment on why Lost Weekend failed 
The survey showed that three of four Staff members (73,3%) felt that inadequate 
marketing was a possible reason of failure, where too small and a wrong focus on the 
marketing efforts were often mentioned.  A clear discrepanyc between the volunteers and 
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Staff was on the question if too little service to volunteers could be a reason for failure.  Here 
the Staff did not see that as a clear reason at all and few viewed it as a possible reason 
(26,7%) while volunteers either thought it was a possible reason for failure (58,8%) or a clear 
reason (11,8%).  This may be an indicator of lack of communication between the divisions of 
Lost Weekend, where the volunteers felt set aside by the Staff.  
“… for instance, backstage crew and stage workes was held responsible for amongst 
other things; guarding equipment, stages, backstage, visitor kiosk and food area all night.  
Immediately after the last concert ended Saturdy night, we had to rig down, pack up, carry 
and trasport all equipement and stages.  During the final party for the volunteers held 
Saturday night and morning, we also had to function a guards and bartenders.  Many of us 
worked for 20 hours each day” – Volunteer comment on why Lost Weekend failed 
External influences.  Both groups agreed on that competition from other festivals, 
both on a local and a national scale may have been a possible or clear reason for the closure of 
Lost Weekend, which is backed by resource dependency theory when festivals find 
themselves in a competitive state.  Both groups also thought that a lack of support from the 
Municipality may have been a possible (Staff 53, 3%, Volunteer 58, 8%) or clear (Staff 13, 
3%, Volunteer 29, 4%) reason for failure.  The weather was seen as a possible reason for 
failure by both groups, but not as a clear reason.  
Human resources.  Volunteers and Staff agree on that the different leaders of Lost 
Weekend had lacked the competence to run the festival; this was one of the most prominent 
clear reasons the respondents thought caused the failure (Clear reason; Staff 60 %, Volunteers 
52, 9%. Possible reason: Staff 33, 3%, Volunteers 35, 2%). 
 “We lacked the ability to raise the total internal competency and to raise the 
knowledge of people with office.  We had to rely on each person to learn individually what 
they needed to know” – Staff comment on why Lost Weekend failed 
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Both groups agreed on that burned out volunteers were a serious problem for the 
festival.  Volunteers also believed that a high turnover of volunteers may have contributed to 
failure.  As mentioned above, some volunteers worked close to 20 hour days during the 
festival.  Many of these were also involved in rigging the festival up the week before and 
down the week after, and spent their entire summer holiday working voluntarily at Lost 
Weekend. 
Financial resources.  The most prominent reasons for failure in this section were 
poor control over costs (Clear: Staff 73, 3%, volunteers 76, 5%) and cash flows (Clear: Staff 
86, 7%).  The Staff also thought that too little attention was directed at different income 
sources.  
 “The economical competence was horrible the first years.  That resulted in that the 
new board in 2006 discovered that the festival had about 3-4 million NOK in debt, when they 
thought it was about 1 million.  This resulted in great consequences for the further operation 
of the festival” – Staff comment on why Lost Weekend failed 
 
Again, most of the respondents believed that a reason for failure were that the 
Municipality and that the local businesses had not been supportive enough financially.  Staff 
(33, 3%) thought that a clear reason for failure was that they received too little support from 
the Municipality, while 46, 7% of the staff thought it was a possible reason.  
Organizational culture.  The Staff and volunteers agreed on internal division over 
goals as a clear reason for failure (Staff 66, 7%, volunteers 58, 8%).  Internal division on 
strategy scored as well high from both groups.  
”The size of the arrangement and the wishes of big headliners surpassed what any 
ideal and volunteer organization could handle.  It became an organization that did not grow 
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and learn together with the arrangement, and there were little willingness to listen to people 
outside of the organization” – Staff comment on why Lost Weekend failed 
Both Staff and volunteers also agreed on Lost Weekend suffering strongly from a lack 
of leadership (Clear: Staff 53, 3%, Volunteers 52, 9%, Possible: Staff 26, 6% Volunteer 35, 
3%) 
“The leaders had no control over who did what” - Volunteer 
“A few people without competence had too much power” - Staff 
Media.  The relations with media were not seen as a high reason of festival failure.  
Both groups did agree on poor handling of the media as a possible reason (Staff 46, 7%, 
Volunteers 35, 3%), but no clear opinion was displayed by the survey.  Some comment was 
however made about the media: 
“The press reviews were good in the beginning, and we got a lot of positive exposure. 
But the mess (economical) was not possible to hide and the articles started to focus on that, 
something that lowered the credibility in the market” – Volunteer 
“Constant negative press reviews about the economical situation the last four years 
gave the festival a shady reputation” - Leader 
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Discussion 
 
The discussion of this study will contain three parts.  Firstly, findings will be discussed 
in relation with capitals, before they will be discussed in relation to life cycle theory. Finally, 
findings from capitals and life cycle theory will be discussed jointly. 
Discussion of findings; Capitals 
 
 Lost Weekend was on its way to become one of the largest festivals in Vestlandet. 
From humble beginnings at the local pub Loftet at Askøy, Torsdagsklubben utilized their 
social network to gather musicians, finances, equipment and a location to create a festival.  In 
ten years, Lost Weekend experienced many issues and obstacles where the number of 
participants went from about 1.000 to 17.000 in four years, and down again to be stable 
somewhere between 5.500 -7.000 visitors the last six.  
Social capital was one of two main capitals which made Lost Weekend possible, 
because of relationships between Lost Weekend and the community at Askøy which were 
strong from the beginning before it declined in the end.  Many of Askøy’s residents were 
directly involved by working as a volunteer, performing at Lost Weekend, supplying goods, 
assisting with financial, or intangible support, working in rescue services at the festival, or by 
being a returning visitor.  While Lost Weekend was conceptually created by few a whole 
community rose to the challenge of executing the actual event.  
As Lost Weekend grew, several new networks were created with organizations in the 
Bergen region.  Sponsors was gathered through a positive image of creativity, enthusiasm and 
culture in the years up to 2005, and after the years with economical troubles started, creditors 
were willing to waive debt in order to sustain the festival.  Lost Weekend also made an 
agreement with Eggstokkfestivalen to let their winner play at the festival.  This was one of the 
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cornerstones of Lost Weekend’s ideology; allowing unknown bands a chance to perform on a 
professional stage.  Several other bands both from Askøy and Bergen got the opportunity to 
try their performance at Lost Weekend. 
The social capital changed during the ten years of production.  As Mykletun  found at 
Ekstemsportveko at Voss, Lost Weekend also had several years of “emergency 
entrepreneurship” – spontaneous, collective efforts using knowledge, trust and leadership 
found in the local social bricolage (Mykletun, 2009) – which were applied to solve crisis in 
the organization.  Unlike Ekstemsportveko, Lost Weekend never managed to exit the state of 
emergency entrepreneurship, and when networks started to fail because of constant 
economical troubles the festival had to discontinue. In ten years, Lost Weekend had three 
festival managers and a manager group, while Lost AS had two leaders, none who managed 
to create stability in Lost Weekend before it was too late. 
Another example of the social capital Lost Weekend generated was the creation of 
new organizations where Lost Weekend functioned as an umbrella organization.  A total of 
five organizations viewed Lost Weekend as a founder, a benefactor or both, three of these 
organizations who worked for youth.   Lost Weekend also gave half of their one and only 
surplus to different musicians in need of support to create and release records.  
“Through Lost Weekend many has seen the value of volunteer work, they have seen 
that it is possible to create something.  At the same time the festival has been something 
people have been proud of and talked about” – Gørild Wold, Youth contact Askøy 
Municipality (5.8.2010 – Bergens Tidene) 
The second main capital of Lost Weekend was the human capital.  The individual 
abilities, charms, courage, and competencies of the people involved in Lost Weekend created 
the original motivations and entrepreneurship of which the festival was established.  The 
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strong human capital was also the basis for the use and development of other capitals, such as 
the social, financial and physical capitals.  
 Lost Weekend can be separated into two divisions of human capital; one set of human 
capital was used from 2001-2005, while another were used from 2005-2010.  In the first five 
years Johannessen was the driving force behind the festival.  He utilized charm, courage, and 
his personal motivations to create networks and a festive emotion surrounding Lost Weekend.   
He did create the identity of the festival by being the face of Lost Weekend in all settings; 
both in the media and through inviting people to join off-festival activities.  His motivation 
and courage did succeed his abilities to actually handling an event as Lost Weekend in a 
sensible way, perhaps because he thought that Lost Weekend was his festival  and that he was 
at liberty to spend festival resources as he saw fit.  Without Johannessen as the identity of 
Lost Weekend, the festival would not have been as successful after just two years. 
“Johannessen was the hugest rock star Askøy ever had.  Even though he could not 
play a single instrument or sing” – Volunteer comment 
After 2005, Johannessen departed from Lost Weekend under distress, and new 
systems and people were put in charge.  Their motivations was not to create the same 
“Woodstock” feeling as Johannessen had for years, but to try rectifying the economical 
situation.  The new organization had people with competences from different business areas, 
such as economy, organizational builds, and management. 
 The change in motivations of Lost Weekend’s board also changed the festival’s image 
to more professional both internally and externally, but the years after 2005 were so 
overshadowed by financial problems that much of the original spirit of the festival was lost. 
Although the human capital used to arrange Lost Weekend 2001-2005 was not sustainable in 
any manner, it is possible that some of the joy of the festival departed with Johannessen.  This 
change in management created a shift in the human capital, but it was still a main capital.   
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The cultural capital was close to non-existent before Lost Weekend started in 2001. 
Askøy did have a tradition of music and concerts from Rockeklubben and Ten-Sing, but none 
had attempted to make an arrangement in that magnitude before.  There were however a 
culture for volunteerism as may often be present in smaller communities.  Many had the 
tradition of supporting local sports teams with volunteer work, and a transition from sport to 
music was not difficult.  Musically, Torsdagsklubben, and Rockeklubben combined were able 
to use their social networks to gather performers and needed equipment.  
 Because the Municipality of Askøy early on gave Lot Weekend public support may 
have helped to increase the community acceptance of the festival.  Many prominent public 
figures at Askøy praised Lost Weekend, and Askøyværinger expressed that Lost Weekend 
had placed Askøy on the map.  When the cultural capital was established in 2003, it remained 
through all following years.   
 The natural attributes of Kollevåg made the physical capital of Lost Weekend special 
compared to many other festivals.  To arrive at Kollevåg, visitors could either use festival 
buses, private cars or boats.  It took about 35 minutes to drive from the center of Bergen to 
Kollevåg, where a 10 minutes’ walk to the camping waited visitors.  By boat, the visitors 
could the first year’s dock where they wanted as long as they were outside the main area. 
Because of no regulations of boaters, Lost Weekend lost income from ticket sales for several 
years before new rules were applied in 2008, where boaters also had to buy tickets if they 
went to shore.  In return boaters got access to electricity, sanitary facilities and a lighted 
shoreline.  
 There was an extinctive expansion of the festival area in Kollevågen.  In five years, 
Lost Weekend had increased its camping capacity by 50% and the allowed visitor number had 
increased from 5.000 in 2001 to 21.000 in 2005.  For instance in 2008, 15 administrative 
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booths, three stages, 1, 2 kilometers of fences, ten showers, 80 toilets and multiple bars were 
rigged by about 50 volunteers the week before Lost Weekend.  
 The financial capital was the crucial point for Lost Weekend.  They did from 2002 
until 2009 receive substantial support from different administrative sources, as well as private 
business sponsors or guarantors.  Financial capital was gathered through the social capital of 
members of Lost Weekend, but had little priority the first five years.  Instead of building Lost 
Weekend in a sensible pace, too many resources were spent on improving physical 
infrastructure in early years before Lost Weekend had achieved a secure visitor base and they 
were more certain of what numbers of visitors to expect.  Together with excessive use of 
financial capital on too expensive bands compared to the visitors’ interest and extravagant 
gatherings for volunteers/sponsors/media, Lost Weekend was losing money instead of 
securing its place in Norway’s festival scene.  Below is a summary of all year’s financial 
situation is included.  Numbers were gathered through articles and private archives and may 
not be accurate.  
Tabell 2 An Estimation of Lost Weekend's Economical Situation 2001 ‐ 2010 
        
 Year 
Debt after 
ended festival 
Sponsor 
support Guaranties Surplus 
Number of 
sold 
tickets  
 2001 170.000  167.000  700  
 2002 380.000 80.000 80.000  2.500  
 2003   320.000 165.000  3.500  
 2004     600.000 17.221  
 2005 1 700 000  200.000     
 2006 1 000 000 200.000  700.000    
 2007   275.000  250.000 9.000  
 2008 3 300 000 500.000   6.500  
 2009 250.000 500.000  500.000 5.856  
 2010 1 000 000    5.800  
 
 
       
The only reason for Lost Weekend’s survival after 2005 was the faith creditors and 
sponsors had in the festival.  Creditors allowed for 60% of the total debt to be waived, and 
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fresh financial capital were given by several sponsors.  Lost Weekend could however not 
spend the 500.000 NOK given from the Municipality to pay debt.  If that had been possible, it 
may have eased the strain on the organization.  A final blow to Lost Weekend was given by 
Skatt Vest in 2010 because of miscommunication surrounding VAT.  
 The administrative capital was also an important influencing capital in the case of 
Lost Weekend.  Lost Weekend was almost in a symbiotic state with the Municipality of 
Askøy, where Askøy received positive media, identity, and increased income for businesses 
because of the festival. Lost Weekend did in return received financial support, social and 
cultural validation, and access to the Municipality’s advisory instances.  Lost Weekend 
received support from Communal and national groups at well, and in comparing with 
Mykletun’s findings at Ekstremsportveko, Lost Weekend were given assistance by different 
administrative groups.  It seems like few festivals have experienced the same level of 
commitment from any public-administrative group.  Even though all networks Lost Weekend 
created seemed to want the festival to overcome its problems, Lost Weekend did not succeed. 
BOF were one of the problems Lost Weekend had to deal with each year, mostly 
because BOF tried to keep the natural beauty of Kollevåg intact.  Lost Weekend did find 
several solutions to please BOF (Mikom, Green patrol, recycling), but close to every year 
BOF were dissatisfied.  The intervention of the Municipality of Askøy in regards to BOF is a 
clear example of administrative capital.  Without intervention, the festival would not have 
survived its first years.  
Capital summary.  No research or theoretical framework could be found on the 
weight balance needed between capitals or to what degree a capital should be present for a 
festival to be successful.  As this research has attempted to display through the summaries of 
Lost Weekend, each year had a shift in presence of capitals where some was strengthened 
while others worsened.  The first years were characterized by a heavy reliance on human and 
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social capitals, which over time influenced financial and physical capitals.  Good relationships 
with the Municipality of Askøy resulted in a stable access to the natural capital.  Human and 
social capital created the basis for Lost Weekend which in turn rendered natural, cultural and 
physical capitals (after 2005) as stable variables. Main differences in capital use were found in 
human, social, financial, and administrative capital. 
It seems like when the financial capital was lowered in 2005 and Lost Weekend 
accumulated a large debt, the social capital also declined the following year.  Social capital 
remained low until 2009 when a boost in the financial capital occurred, and social capital 
again was raised.  This may not be because of relations between capitals, but a feeling of 
internal security which may lead to a boost in motivation of members.  
 It may be possible to assume that while human and social capitals are the most 
prominent capitals in the beginning of a festival such as Lost Weekend, all capitals have their 
importance at stages of the development of festivals.  The next chapter will attempt to place 
Lost Weekend in the stages of Butler’s life cycle before capital needs at each stage will be 
identified. 
Discussion of findings; Life cycle 
 
 Lost Weekend did experience a life cycle as described earlier in this thesis. The years 
2001 and partly 2002 were characterized by a close connection and interaction between Lost 
Weekend and its visitors, perhaps because most of the visitors were from Askøy or other 
locations in close proximity.  Lost Weekend was in the explorative state of Butler’s (1980) 
life cycle.  Both the event itself and number of visitors were small, and visitors to Lost 
Weekend did little or no impact on Askøy in general.  There were no real facilities at 
Kollevåg except from the absolute necessary equipment needed to host concerts.  In 2002 
some improvements in regards to visitor facilities, but the main development started to occur 
in 2003.  Lost Weekend entered into the involvement stage, where visitors had started to 
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arrive at the camp site before the festival started.  Lost Weekend started with new PR stunts 
such as the media cruise to attract public interest in the festival in 2003, and there were a high 
level of interactions between Lost Weekend, musicians, sponsors, and media.  The festival 
managed to attract sponsors and organizations outside of Askøy, and was nominated to its 
first award which was received in 2004. 
 By 2004, Lost Weekend had reached its development stage.  Remediation was done at 
the festival and camping areas, while services and facilities were added to accommodate 
about 17.000 visitors.  Lost Weekend had become popular, and visitors from other locations 
than the festivals immediate surrounding had started to attend what was known as “Norway’s 
most beautiful festival”.  A 60% position was offered to Johannessen to continue the 
development of Lost Weekend, and Lost Weekend received massive positive media coverage.  
 Year 2005 Lost Weekend was still in the development stage.  Facilities directed at 
visitors were bettered and attempts to correct the relationship with BOF were put into action. 
Lost Weekend tried to control their growth by creating some internal structures and developed 
an organizational map in attempt to create a clear description of tasks and responsibilities.  
Lost Weekend was at the same time functioning as an umbrella for other organizations.  2005 
was however the beginning of the end for Lost Weekend.  With a huge deficit even though a 
large number of visitors came to Lost Weekend, it seemed as the board had lost control over 
the festival.  
The development stage continued in 2006 where Lost Weekend spent much effort on 
correcting the deficit from 2005.  They did attempt to expand Lost Weekend to a total of four 
stages with well established bands and artists featured at each stage.  Some members of the 
Askøy community were however not impressed by Lost Weekend and sent accusations about 
drug use to different stakeholders of Lost Weekend.  Commercial actors were allowed access 
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into the festival, something which may have contributed to a loss of ownership in the 
community.  
Consolidation was experienced by Lost Weekend in 2007.  Numbers of visitors were 
approximately 9.000, and 2007 featured the best musically program Lost Weekend produced 
through all ten years, but the festival were nowhere near the 17.000 visitors from 2004.  Lost 
Weekend again attempted to downscale the festival to a sensible size and cancelled one of 
four stages.  The Municipality of Askøy calculated in 2007-2008 that Lost Weekend 
generated about 14 million NOK in revenues for different businesses at Askøy 
The years of 2008-2009 experienced stagnation, with visitors numbers stabilized at 
somewhere from 5.800 – 6.500.  The musical programs were not as grand as previous years 
and base visitors who had attended Lost Weekend for years were the main target group.  
There were still support present in the community but both volunteers and Staff started to feel 
the strain of years with the threat of possible discontinuing looming.  2010 was the final year 
with the state of decline.  Numbers of visitors were the approximately the same as the last two 
years, but the financial situation of Lost Weekend could not be salvaged this time.  The 
emotional stress experienced by Staff members because of VAT claims and old debt lead to 
the final concert held by Lost Weekend in Kollevåg. 
The year following the discontinuation of Lost Weekend, Periferi-festivalen who had 
its base on a neighboring island attempted to arrange a festival called Losten in Kollevåg. 
Both the concert and camping areas of Losten were at what Lost Weekend had used as the 
camping area.  Losten were allowed to use both the nickname of Lost Weekend and many of 
their contacts and resources, but Lost Weekend distanced themselves completely from the 
implementation of Losten.  In the present (2012) it is very uncertain of Kollevåg will feature a 
festival, since BOF once again was dissatisfied with the cleaning of the area and refuses to 
lend Kollevåg to Losten.  
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Life cycle and capitals 
 
Lost Weekend experienced different stages in their life cycle which resulted in 
changes in capitals.  Lost Weekend started in an explorative stage where the festivals needs 
were met because of the strong presence of human, social, and natural capitals.  When the 
festival grew from a festival in an explorative or involvement stage to a festival in a 
development stage (2004 - 2006), human capital and social capital were not enough to create 
a sustainable festival.  In 2004 it seemed that Lost Weekend had an adequate use of all 
capitals.  This was the only year Lost Weekend could fulfill their intentions of donating 
surplus to the Askøy music community.  
In 2005 Lost Weekend was not able to either access or correctly use all capitals 
needed at the development stage.  An example of a possible fault in use of capitals could for 
instance be the rapid growth in physical capital in 2004 – 2005.  The festival had positive 
income for two years, but instead of strategically planning how to best use the financial 
security they experienced, money were for instance spent on a Lisa Ekdahl concert for about 
100 volunteers.  Excessive costly bookings for several years in the development and partly 
consolidation stage contributed to a faulty usage of financial capital, especially when many 
visitors had a social aspect as the most important with Lost Weekend and the music as second 
as discovered by Fjell (2008).  
Lost Weekend had declines in human, social, and administrative capitals and the 
financial capital was still out of control.  Human capital did not decline worse because it only 
experienced a shift in motivations and competence and not a lack of motivations.  The new 
human capital in 2006 attempted to improve the financial capital. 
In the consolidation stage of 2007 all original Lost Weekend board members left the 
organization while the financial capital had not improved.  The board was now without the 
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visions and ideology the festival was based on, which had implications on the recognitions of 
volunteers.  The decline in social capital had started after Lost Weekend allowed commercial 
actors to take part of the festival in 2005 and continued to decline as the human capital within 
Lost Weekend also changed.  Human capital reached its lowest point in the stagnation stage 
of 2008.  Social and human capital was the main focus of the board until after the festival in 
2006, where they were exchanged them with focus on financial capital.  It seems that Lost 
Weekend experienced difficulties in its rapid transaction from a “feel good” festival to a focus 
on the festival as a business.   
In the early stagnation of 2008, losses of motivations were felt by the new board. 
There were a massive focus on financial problems both internally and externally of the 
organization.  The new board of Lost Weekend had skills and competences needed to improve 
the financial capital, but they did not achieve the necessary results.  Combined with little of 
the previous “feel good” mood, it seems like the board felt de-motivated by the current 
situation.  
In year 2009, the board started to achieve some control of the financial capital before 
the festival was held and their debt was reduced to mere 250.000 NOK after the festival. 
Financial control created a calmer organizational mood, where social and human capitals 
again started to rise.  It seemed as Lost Weekend had the possibility to rejuvenate itself based 
on this improvements of capitals.  However, 2010 the financial problems were back due to 
owed VAT and no financial support from the Municipality.  This resulted in strained 
relationships whit various social networks and a loss of human capital.  Lost Weekend 
reached decline instead of the previously expected rejuvenation, and the festival “died”. 
Summarizing findings 
 
 An overall reason for the failure of Lost Weekend was that they did not understand 
that running a festival had a business aspect before it was too late.  The following are the 
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accumulated reasons from findings through analyses of articles, archives, interviews and 
survey. 
1) There was no strong leadership in Lost Weekend after Johannessen was excluded from 
the organization in 2006, which were one major issue for the festival.  Several leaders 
both in Lost Weekend and Lost AS attempted to steer the festival in to a new organization 
but without a person with strong positive human capital they failed. Johannessen were the 
face of Lost Weekend, and when he was eliminated from the festival most of the image of 
Lost Weekend went with him.  What was left was an economical chaos which only 
reduced the positive image of Lost Weekend. 
2) Lost Weekend grew too fast in comparison to its age and needs.  Already in 2003 – 2004, 
Lost Weekend had more than tripled its visitor capacity, and extensive improvements 
were made to the festival area before Lost Weekend established their number of base 
visitors.  Lost Weekend did not take into account that many visitors had the social as a 
primary reason for participation. 
3) Lost Weekend outgrew the level of competency/skills that existed within the 
organization.  In 2005, attempts were made to professionalize the festival internally but 
the new structure were not used or followed by the organization’s members who were 
used to a ‘certain way’ of operation.  The lack of professional skills was also noticed by 
the media, who also called for changes that had to be made if Lost Weekend were to 
continue.  
4) Lack of financial control was another major reason for failure.  In 2003 – 2004, Lost 
Weekend had positive income but was not able to control costs, create a ‘real’ budget, or 
to follow a set budget.  The years after 2005 was strongly affected by the deficit of 1, 7 
million NOK, and debt followed Lost Weekend until its end in 2010.  Economical chaos 
both damaged the external image of Lost Weekend and their internal unity. 
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5) Lost Weekend was created by a group of friends and their extended circle.  During the 
survey, indications were made by respondents that this structure made it very difficult for 
new people to join the “inner circle”.   This may have resulted in a loss of ownership and 
lead to a lowered interest in the volunteers.  Losing Torsdagsklubben as a meeting place 
outside of Lost Weekend may also have contributed to this effect. 
6) The festival did not create its own niche because of an ever changing musical 
profile and combined with the change in image, Lost Weekend was not sustainable.  It 
was no longer enough to be the only rock festival on Askøy when it had to compete with 
several others both on a local and national scale. Because it did have a great amount of 
goodwill from the local community their initial strategy worked for several years. 
Conclusions  
 
The research question of this thesis was “why festivals fail”.  To answer this question, 
in the case of Lost Weekend, a capital framework and product life cycle theory was applied. 
Life cycle theory was used to establish if there were differences in use of capitals during the 
life cycle stages.  The capital framework has evolved from its start with Bourdieu (1968) 
cultural capital, where an additional six has been added during the years.  All seven capitals 
were for the first time applied by Mykletun in his study of Ekstremsportveko in 2009, where 
the administrative capital were described and added to the capital framework. 
Lost Weekend was analyzed through the same capital framework as Mykletun (2009).  
The administrative capital has in this research besides the social, human, and financial 
capitals been a prominent capital and was important to create an understanding of Lost 
Weekend.  The strong relationship between the Municipality of Askøy and Lost Weekend 
proved to be valuable both for the development and sustainability of the festival, which was 
expressed through guaranties, sponsorships, and assistance when dealing with other public 
services.  This presence of administrative capital also gave Lost Weekend access to the 
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natural capital, and the festival would probably not have been able to be arranged without the 
Municipality’s support.  The administrative capital was well represented over a long time 
span and with several changes in personnel on both sides.  Every fourth year new politicians 
were elected into the Presidency of Askøy, and the administrative section of the Municipality 
had changes in employments, and still the good relationships stayed for almost years.  When 
some of the support from the Municipality in 2010 was cancelled, Lost Weekend also had its 
final year of production.   
It is a loss for this research that access to the Municipality’s archives were not 
accessible because it could have provided a more nuanced understanding of how the 
administrative capital were handled.  The value of understanding connections between an 
event and public servants or regulators was not described by the capital framework before 
Mykletun’s introduction of administrative capital, and has in this research been an important 
addition to the framework.  
Control of financial capital is important on two levels; 1) it is important because of the 
economic possibilities which come with sponsors and financial support, and 2) it is important 
to control internally in an organization because if a wish is to attract new sponsors, the 
organization have to be able to exhibit financial security and stability to potential contributors.  
In the first years of production, little attention was given to the financial capital and that was a 
serious fault in the management of Lost Weekend.  However, in the latter years too much 
focus was on the financial capital, which may have lead to a disregard to human and social 
capitals. 
The change in human capital Lost Weekend experienced also changed the internal and 
external expression of Lost Weekend, which may be an interesting finding.  It appeared that 
the personal motivations of the individuals in charge of the festival were expressed through 
how the media related to and how volunteers experienced Lost Weekend.  The identity of the 
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festival was too interrelated with specific individual’s competencies and motivations, and may 
be something other festivals should be aware of.  Few people should perhaps not have that 
kind of influence on an event and an event should not rely on individuals to maintain its 
image in the community.  
 Lost Weekend is an example of how social capital may be a facilitating capital when 
arranging Not-for-Profit events.  Networks owned by the group initially generated all capitals 
needed to arrange Lost Weekend, but speculations can be made if this capital was perceived 
as important by the board after the festival had gained its needs.  It seems that when Lost 
Weekend proceeded in its life cycle, few new networks were created.  This may have been a 
strategic error made by the board because of the basic nature of Not-for-Profit festivals where 
networks and the sharing of information and knowledge should have a strong position in the 
strategy of the board. 
The human, social, and financial capitals of Lost Weekend were highly interrelated.  It 
appeared that a lack of control of the financial capital had devastating effect on other capitals 
the further Lost Weekend reached in their life cycle, which were the main reason for the 
failure of Lost Weekend.   
Recommendations 
 
A possible strategic fault made by Lost Weekend was the discrepancy between the 
motivations of the board members, who focused on the content of Lot Weekend, and the 
motivations of visitors13 who focused on the social setting Lost Weekend created.  Mismatch 
between motivations of arrangers and stakeholders may be of importance for an event, and the 
researcher is unsure if this aspect is well enough described by the existing cultural and social 
capitals.  A capital which explores visitor intentions could perhaps be added to the discussed 
framework, where an understanding of visitor’s perception of content, intent, and significance 
                                                 
13 Findings through interviews and survey, supported by Fjell (2008) 
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of an event is discussed.  Visitors are important stakeholders who may decide the success of 
an event, but they are not perceived by the researcher as a clear part of any present capitals.  
This aspect may be developed and researched in future research.  
This research applied the capital framework to analyze a festival, but because it had a 
historical perspective it differenced from previous studies in needs for understanding capital 
use in festival research were discovered.  In the theoretical framework of capitals used to 
analyze festivals, little could be found on the internal degree of presence of a capital.  In the 
case of Lost Weekend, a need to grade the presence of each of the capitals early appeared.  It 
was not perceived as appropriate to define a capital as present or not present, but that the level 
of presence influenced the outcomes of Lost Weekend.  Because no research could be found 
on how to operationalize shifts in degree of presence, attempts were made to visualize this 
through color coding changes in capitals.  Further research on capital framework in a festival 
setting could include the aspect of grading the presence of capitals.  Research could also 
include establishing the needed degree of presence of capitals to create a sustainable festival 
through stages of a life cycle in a Norwegian Not-for-Profit community festival setting. 
As Mykletun (2009) calls for in the end of his analysis of Ekstremsportveko, this 
research has attempted to analyze an unsuccessful festival through the capital framework.  A 
new context was applied to test the generalization of capital framework as a method for 
understanding festival successes or failure. While findings in this research may not be prudent 
to generalize because of lack of comparison to other festivals, it supports the inclusion of the 
administrative capital the capital framework and the use of capital framework as a method of 
gaining understanding of festivals.   
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10.6.2005 ‐ Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/kultur/kipekjerringa_til_lw‐tom/ ‐ Linn 
   Dyveke Wilberg, read 8.4.2012 
2.8.2005 – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/kultur/‐dette_er_nodt_til_a_bli_bra/ ‐ 
Linn Dyveke Wilberg, read 4.5.2012 
4.8.2005 – Bergens Tidene ‐ http://www.bt.no/bergenpuls/konsert/Kompisfestivalen‐
2303867.html ‐ Kjersti Mokleiv & Hege Hammersland,  read 4.4.2012 
8.8.2005 – Bergens Tidene ‐ http://www.bt.no/bergenpuls/konsert/Helt‐strokent‐etter‐
rekordfestivalen‐2304115.html ‐ Olav Gorseth, read 6.4.2012 
12.8.2005 – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/kultur/darlige_lw‐tall/ ‐ Linn Dyveke  
  Wilberg, read 4.4.2012 
7.10.2005 – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/kultur/mer_betalingstrobbel_for_lw/ ‐ 
Linn Dyveke Wilberg, read 4.4.2012 
4.11.2005 – ibergen.no ‐ http://pub.nettavisen.no/nettavisen/ibergen/article486970.ece ‐  
  Henrik Færevåg, read 4.4.2012 
13.10.2005 – Bergensavisen ‐ http://www.ba.no/puls/article1781597.ece ‐ Frank Johnsen,  
  read 4.4.2012 
10.11.2005 – Bergens Tidene ‐ http://www.bt.no/bergenpuls/Flommer‐over‐av‐festivaler‐
2323139.html ‐ Guro Istad, read 10.4.2012 
21.11.2005 – Bergensavisen ‐ http://www.ba.no/puls/article1836412.ece ‐ Ruth Hege  
  Halstensen, read 4.4.2012 
13.12.2005 a – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/debatt/lostweekend‐
festivalenilopetav/, read 4.4.2012 
13.12.2005 b – Askøyværingen ‐ 
http://www.askoyv.no/nyheter/slik_skal_lost_weekend_reddes/ ‐ Linn Dyveke Wilberg, read 
   4.4.2012 
23.12.2005 – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/nyheter/lw_far_ikke_milliongaranti/ ‐ 
  Linn Dyveke Wilberg, read 20.4.2012 
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2006 
10.1.2006 – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/kultur/hektistmote‐
ukeforlostweekend/ ‐ John Økland. read 4.4.2012 
16.1.2006 – Bergens Tidene ‐ http://www.bt.no/bergenpuls/konsert/Lost‐Weekend‐vil‐leve‐
videre‐1791110.html ‐ Arild Berg Karlsen, Einar H. Spang & Mari Myren, read 8.4.2012 
8.2.2006 – Bergens Tidene ‐ http://www.bt.no/bergenpuls/Far‐ikke‐penger‐fra‐kommunen‐
1793713.html ‐ Arild Berg Karlsen, read 6.4.2012 
21.2.2006 – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/nyheter/lw_dropper_kommunen/ ‐  
  Tina Åmodt, read 6.4.2012 
17.3.2006 – Bergens Tidene ‐ http://www.bt.no/bergenpuls/Lost‐Weekend‐reddes‐
1797577.html, read 6.4.2012 
21.3.2006 – Askøyværingen ‐  http://www.askoyv.no/nyheter/‐ja_det_blir_lw/ ‐ Yngve  
   Johnsen, read 6.4.2012  
16.5.2006 – Bergensavisen ‐ http://www.ba.no/puls/festivaler/article2102469.ece, read  
  6.5.2012 
30.6.2006 – Bergensavisen ‐ http://www.ba.no/puls/festivaler/article2172502.ece ‐ Frank  
  Johnsen, read 15.4.2012 
5.7.2006 – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/nyheter/‐styrket_av_e‐post‐saken/ ‐  
  Yngve Johnsen, read 15.4.2012 
12.7.2006 – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/kultur/lw_trenger_frivillige/ ‐ Marius  
  Kambestad, read 6.4.2012 
19.7.2006 – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/kultur/‐lw_blir_bedre_enn_noensinne/  
  ‐ Marius Kambestad, read 6.4.2012 
23.11.2006 – Bergens Tidene ‐ http://www.bt.no/nyheter/lokalt/Losner‐livreimen‐
1824122.html ‐ Kari Pedersen, read 10.4.2012 
24.11.2006 – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/nyheter/lw_fikk_275_000/ ‐ Yngve  
  Johnsen, read 6.4.2012 
 
2007 
2.5.2007 – Askøyværingen ‐ 
http://www.askoyv.no/kultur/lostweekendtargrepomokonomien/ ‐ Stig Erik Elliott, read  
  10.4.2012 
30.5.2007 – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/kultur/festivalstemningpatoppikolleva/  
  ‐ Mari Møen, read 10.5.2012 
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6.6.2007 – Bergens Tidene ‐ http://www.bt.no/bergenpuls/musikk/Forhandlet‐bort‐
halvparten‐av‐billettinntektene‐1849205.html ‐ Finn Bjørn Tønder, read 7.5.2012 
22.6.2007 – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/debatt/vaere‐eller‐ikke‐vaere‐for‐lw/ ‐  
  Leder, read 15.4.2012 
5.7.2007 – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/kultur/ikke‐helt‐i‐mal‐‐‐enna/ ‐ Sveinung  
  Tvedt, read 9.4.2012 
10.7.2007 – Bergens Tidene ‐ http://www.bt.no/bergenpuls/musikk/‐‐Lost‐Weekend‐vokste‐
for‐fort‐1852399.html – Erlend Langeland Haugen, read 7.4.2012 
2.8.2007 – Bergensavisen ‐ http://www.bt.no/bergenpuls/konsert/‐‐Taler‐nytt‐underskudd‐
1852533.html – Christian Lura, read 20.4.2012 
6.8.2007 – Bergensavisen ‐ http://www.ba.no/nyheter/article2911621.ece ‐ Birgitte Vaksdal, 
   read 7.4.2012 
23.8.2007 – Bergensavisen ‐ http://www.ba.no/puls/festivaler/article2943755.ece ‐ Frank  
  Johnsen, read 7.4.2012 
28.8.2007 – Dagbladet ‐ http://www.dagbladet.no/kultur/2007/08/28/510253.html, read 
   7.4.2012 
6.9.2007 – Askøyværingen ‐  
http://www.askoyv.no/debatt/valgbloggen/sosialistisk_venstreparti/lost‐weekend‐askoy2/ ‐ 
   Åge Rosnes, read 20.4.2012 
 
2008 
17.1.2008 – Askøyværingen ‐  http://www.askoyv.no/kultur/lost‐weekend‐er‐ikke‐tapt/ ‐  
  Silje Vestvik, read 7.4.2012 
31.1.2008 – Bergensavisen ‐ http://www.ba.no/puls/festivaler/article3317148.ece ‐ Frank  
  Johnsen, read 10.4.2012 
6.8.2008 – Bergensavisen ‐ http://www.ba.no/puls/festivaler/article3704117.ece ‐ Birgitte 
   Vaksdal, read 10.4.2012 
12.8.2008, modified 5.8.2009 – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/kultur/lost‐
weekend/sv‐stotter‐lw/ ‐ Hilde Kristin Strand, read 10.4.2012 
23.10.2008 – Bergensavisen ‐ http://www.ba.no/puls/festivaler/article3872364.ece ‐ Eirik 
   Langeland Fjeld, read 7.4.2012 
23.10.2008 – Bergens Tidene ‐ http://www.bt.no/bergenpuls/konsert/Lost‐Weekend‐er‐
historie‐1904345.html ‐ Jan Oklum & Tonje Aursland, read 7.4.2012 
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28.10.2008 – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/kultur/musikerne‐reagerer‐med‐stor‐
skuffelse/ ‐ Tommy Nilsen, read 7.4.2012 
15.11.2008 – Bergensavisen ‐ http://www.ba.no/puls/article3923762.ece ‐ Frank Johnsen, 
   read 20.4.2012 
21.11.2008, modified 5.8.2009 – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/kultur/lost‐
weekend/sv‐stotter‐lw/ ‐ Hilde Kristin Strand, read 7.4.2012 
28.11.2008 – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/kultur/satser‐pa‐barn‐og‐unge/ ‐ Hilde 
   Kristin Strand, read 7.4.2012 
29.12.2008 – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/kultur/lost‐weekend/lost‐weekend‐
fikk‐momskutt‐i‐tidlig‐julegave/ ‐ Stig Erik Elliot, read 7.4.2012 
 
2009 
3.1.2009 – Bergensavisen ‐ http://www.ba.no/puls/festivaler/article4023753.ece ‐ Frank 
   Johnsen, read 21.4.2012 
6.2.2009 a – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/kultur/lost‐weekend/lost‐weekend‐er‐
reddet/ ‐ Tommy Nilsen, read 7.4.2012 
6.2.2009 b – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/kultur/jubler‐for‐avgjorelsen/ ‐ Stig  
  Erik Elliot 
3.3.2009 – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/kultur/lost‐weekend/moller‐fronter‐lost‐
weekend/ ‐ Stig Erik Elliot, read 7.4.2012 
5.8.2009 – Bergens Tidene ‐ http://www.bt.no/bergenpuls/Lost‐arbeidsgjeng‐1929436.html  
  ‐ Maria Pile Svåsand, read 7.4.2012 
13.8.2009 – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/kultur/lost‐weekend/frivillige‐jobbet‐
seg‐syke/ ‐ Stig Erik Elliot, read 21.4.2012 
18.8.2009 – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/kultur/lost‐weekend/losten‐solgte‐
5_856‐billetter/ ‐ Stig Erik Elliot, read 10.4.2012 
20.11.2009 – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/kultur/lost‐weekend/solid‐overskudd‐
for‐losten/ ‐ Ingen Elise J. Økland, read 7.4.2012 
 
2010 
21.7.2010 – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/kultur/lost‐weekend/toffere‐booking‐
uten‐stotte/ ‐ Stig Erik Elliot, read 16.4.2012 
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5.8.2010 – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/kultur/lost‐weekend/trofaste‐festival‐
campere/ ‐ Kristian Bolstad, read 16.4.2012 
5.8.2010 – Bergens Tidene ‐ http://www.bt.no/bergenpuls/‐‐Det‐er‐en‐are‐1781657.html 
  Ronald E. Hole & Kjetil Kopren Ullebø, read 16.4.2012 
17.12.2010 – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/debatt/festival‐pa‐askoy_‐lost‐for‐
godt/ ‐ Sveinung Tvedt, read 18.4.2012 
21.12.2010 – Askøyværingen ‐ http://www.askoyv.no/kultur/vil‐gi‐lost‐juridisk‐hjelp/ ‐  
  Sveinung Tved, read 21.4.2012 
2011 
8.4.2011‐ Bergens Tidene ‐ http://www.bt.no/bergenpuls/‐‐Kan‐ha‐godt‐av‐et‐tenkear‐
2483624.html – Ørjan Torheim, read 21.4.2012 
 
 
Archival articles 
2001 
 
19.7.2001, Updatet 07.10.2001 NRK P3 Kaliber – Totto Mjelde, adapted for web by Tor‐Erling 
T. Ruud, Upunkt 
3.8.2001 ‐ Askøyværingen – Hildegunn M. Størksen 
24.8.2001 ‐ Askøyværingen – Linn Dyveke Wilberg 
28.8.2001 ‐ Askøyværingen –Linn Dyveke Wilberg 
31.8.2001 ‐ Askøyværingen – Linn Dyveke Wilberg 
31.8.2001 ‐ Bergensavisen – Guro Istad 
3.9.2001 ‐ Bergens Tidene – Turid Kjetland 
4.10.2001 ‐ Askøyværingen – Harald O. Clausen, responsible editor 
 
2002 
 
8.2.2002 ‐ Askøyværingen – Notice  
28.5.2002 ‐ Askøyværingen – Mona Øverby 
07.6.2002 ‐ Askøyværingen – Rolf Erik Veland 
11.6.2002 ‐ Askøyværingen ‐ Rolf Erik Veland 
10.7.2002 ‐ Askøyværingen ‐ Rolf Erik Veland 
24.7.2002 ‐ Askøyværingen – Turi P. Grønbech 
25.7.2002 ‐ Bergen ByNight.no – Kenneth Høyland 
6.8.2002 Askøyværingen – Leder 
9.8.2002 ‐ Bergens Tidene – Einar Engelstad  
11.8.2002 Bergens Tidene ‐ Lars Holger Ursin 
13.8.2002 ‐ Askøyværingen – Leder/editor Harald O. Clausen 
16.8.2002 ‐ Askøyværingen – Yngve Johnsen 
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23.8.2002 ‐ Askøyværingen – Yngve Johnsen 
30.8.2002 ‐ Askøyværingen – Rolf Erik Veland 
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2003 
 
4.3.2003 ‐ Bergensavisen – Marte Bjørklund 
4.3.2003 ‐ Askøyværingen – Yngve Johnsen 
7.3.2003 ‐ Askøyværingen – Yngve Johnsen 
23.5.2003 ‐ Askøyværingen – Tor Halvorsen 
13.6.2003 ‐ Askøyværingen – Harald O. Clausen 
20.6.2003 ‐ Askøyværingen – Tor Halvorsen 
30.5.2003 ‐ Askøyværingen – Tor Halvorsen 
7.8.2003 ‐ Bergens Tidene – Anne‐Cathrine Reuterdal 
8.8.2003 ‐ Askøyværingen – Rolf Erik Veland 
9.8.2003 ‐ Bergens Tidene ‐ Anne‐Cathrine Reuterdal and Einar Engelstad 
10.8.2003 ‐ Bergens Tidene – Einar Engelstad 
11.8.2003 ‐ Bergens Tidene – Gard Steiro and Pål Engesæter 
11.8.2003 ‐ Bergens Tidene – Einar Engelstad 
11.8.2003 ‐ Bergensavisen – Lasse Bjarte Hove 
12.8.2003 ‐ Askøyværingen – Rolf Erik Veland (Leder) 
26.8.2003 ‐ Askøyværingen – Yngve Johnsen 
17.12.2003 – Askøyværingen – Rolf Erik Veland 
2004 
 
6.1.2004 ‐ Askøyværingen – Yngve Johnsen 
9.3.2004 ‐ Askøyværingen ‐ Tor Halvorsen 
21.7.2004 ‐ Askøyværingen – Yngve Johnsen 
22.7.2004 ‐ Bergens Tidene – Lars Holger Ursin 
2.8.2004 ‐ Bergensavisen 
3.8.2004 ‐ Bergens Tidene – Anne‐Cathrine Reuterdahl  
3.8.2004 ‐ Askøyværingen – Tor Halvorsen 
6.8.2004 ‐ Bergens Tidene – Olav Gorseth 
7.8.2004 Bergens Tidene – Olav Gorseth 
10.8.2004 ‐ Bergens Tidene – Einar Engelstad 
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Appendix A: Survey text 
I hvilken grad mener du at Lost Weekend ble påvirket av de 
følgende påstandene? Sett kun ett kryss ved hver påstand. Var ikke et problem 
 En mulig grunn til 
hvorfor LW mislyktest 
En klar grunn til hvorfor 
LW mislyktest 
Markedsføring/Planlegging       
Utilstrekkelig markedsføring eller promotering       
Mangel på fremskritt eller strategisk planlegging       
Lite oppmerksomhet gitt til program eller servicekvalitet 
(Internt)       
Festivalprogrammet forble uendret       
Mangel på markedsundersøkelse       
LW viste ikke sine økonomiske fordeler utad (sponsorer)       
LW utviklet et dårlig image eller rykte       
LW var ikke unikt nok til å forbli attraktivt       
LW ble arrangert på et upassende sted       
LW's program var ikke tilpasset publikum       
Eksterne krefter       
Været       
Konkurranse fra lignende festivaler i området       
Konkurranse fra festivaler på samme tid som LW       
Mangel på støtte fra politikere       
Inflasjon/ høyere kostnader       
Reguleringer og lovpålagte hindringer       
Lokalsamfunnet støttet ikke lenger LW       
Menneskelige ressurser       
LW hadde inkompetente ledere eller stab       
Utbrente frivillige       
Intern korrupsjon eller tyverier       
Høy utskiftning av frivillige       
Finansielle ressurser       
Mangel på støtte fra bedrifter       
For mye tillit på kun en finansiell kilde       
For lite oppmerksomhet rettet mot inntektsmuligheter       
Dårlig kontroll over kostnader       
Problemer med kontantstrøm (tom for penger før festivalens 
første dag)       
Organisasjonskultur       
Mangel på sterkt lederskap       
Intern splittelse over mål, program, strategi osv.       
Den interne strukturen tillater ikke de endringene som behøves       
Endringer som behøvdes ble ikke implementert på grunn av 
uvilje fra oppstarterne       
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Appendix B: Organizational map Lost Weekend 2005 
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Appendix C: Letter to creditors 2005 
 
 Askøy, 11. november 2005 
 
Følgende brev er sendt samtlige registrert kreditorer i Lost Weekend 
 
 
Orientering om likviditetssituasjonen og tiltak i Lost Weekend  
Styret i Lost Weekend beklager den økonomiske situasjonen som Lost Weekend 
befinner seg i på nåværende tidspunkt. Styret innser at den administrative delen av 
festivalen ikke ble i varetatt på en god måte, noe som har medførte at 
økonomistyringen på kostnadssiden ikke har vært god nok. Den formelle 
økonomistyringen på inntektssiden ble håndtert på en tilfredsstillende måte bl.a. 
ved salg av billetter via Posten. 
Det økonomiske resultatet fra årets festival viser et driftsunderskudd på ca. 1.7 
mill.kr., mot et budsjettert overskudd på kr. 600.000.-.  Hovedårsakene til 
underskuddet var vært manglende koordinering av kostnadene – en del grupper som 
har hatt ansvar for gjennomføringen av festivalen har ikke hatt noe forhold til 
budsjetterte kostnader. Videre var det en generell dårlig kostnadsstyring i 
forbindelse med avvikling av festivalen.  
Lost Weekend økonomiske situasjon er at det ikke er likviditet til å dekke 71 
kreditorer som har tilsvarende til gode som årets underskudd. Styret har som mål å 
skaffe tilveie tilstrekkelig med likviditet for å dekke årets underskudd og dermed å 
gjøre opp for kreditorenes tilgodehavende.  Styret ber om forståelse at det vil ta 
tid å finne løsninger på likviditetsproblemene. 
Til å bistå styret er det nedsatt en gruppe med personer, som på frivillig basis har 
sagt seg villig til å prøve å finne løsninger på situasjonen.  Gruppen består av 
personer som har en tilknytning til festivalen, men i tillegg er det personer med i 
gruppen som ikke har hatt noe forhold til festivalen, men som har en bakgrunn fra 
næringslivet innenfor profilering, sponsorhåndtering, 
regnskap/budsjettering/økonomi. Arbeidsgruppen som prøver å få til en løsning, i 
forhold til de økonomiske forholdene, er usikker på om alle krav knyttet til årets 
festival er registrert. Ytterligere krav kan medføre økt underskudd og økt behov for 
likviditet.   
Arbeidsgruppen har fått fullmakt fra styret til å ordne opp i de økonomiske 
forholdene. I fullmakten er det inkludert at styret p.t. ikke kan gjøre disposisjoner 
som medfører økonomisk binding på vegne av Lost Weekend.  Tilgang til eventuelle 
midler på bankkonti og til Nettbank styres av arbeidsgruppen inntil det er funnet 
en økonomisk løsning på å dekke underskuddet.  Styret har gitt sin tilslutning til 
dette. 
 
Hvordan skal arbeidsgruppen klare å skape nødvendig likviditet i Loft Weekend? I 
møte den 31. oktober ble det besluttet å vurdere å selge ut festivalens aktiviteter 
helt eller delvis. Styret vil opprettholde den løpende virksomheten med å ivareta 
kontakten mot eventuelle artister til neste års festival, men begrense sin 
virksomhet til å knytte til seg artister på grunnlag av intensjonsavtaler, hvor det er 
klare betingelser at avtalene må bekreftes når Lost Weekends gjeld fra årets 
festival er dekket inn. 
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Arbeidsgruppen er på nåværende tidspunkt avhengig av ”arbeidsro” for å finne 
løsninger på problemene. Gruppen har et håp om at samtlige kreditorer vil gi 
arbeidsgruppen en mulighet til å finne nødvendige gode løsninger både for 
kreditorer og festivalen. Bl.a. vil vi anmode om at de respektives tilgodehavende 
ikke oversendes til inkassoselskap o.l., samtidig som vi anmoder om at samtlige 
kreditorer frafaller eventuelle morarenter og andre gebyr.  Vi håper også at 
kreditorene vurderer å sanere sitt tilgodehavende helt eller delvis. 
Arbeidsgruppen vil ultimo desember, eller så snart eventuelle løsninger er på plass, 
gi en ny orientering om situasjonen for Lost Weekend.        
Arbeidsgruppen er takknemlig å få en kort tilbakemelding om hvordan samtlige 
kreditorer vurderer gruppens anmodning.  Videre er det en fordel at samtlige 
kreditorer bekrefter sitt totale tilgodehavende og eventuelt redusert krav, slik at 
gruppen kan få det avstemt med sine notater. 
 
Vi anmoder om at tilbakemeldingen sendes til følgende e-post adresse:  
 
ronny@lost-weekend.net  (også kontaktperson for media) 
 
 
for Styret i Lost Weekend 
Arbeidsgruppen 
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RESULTATREGNSKAP
REGNSKAP 
2005
 BUDSJETT 
2005 AVVIK
Salgsinntekter -3.013.566 -4.050.000 1.036.434
Andre salgsinntekter -2.534.265 -925.000 -1.609.265
Sum driftsinntekter -5.547.831 -4.975.000 -572.831
 
Lønnskostnader 299.933 340.000 -40.067
Diverse honorar 458.563 100.000 358.563
Varekjøp 1.035.685 0 1.035.685
Booking 1.655.181 1.100.000 555.181
Hotelopphold 135.830 300.000 -164.170
Seminarkostnader 32.664 0 32.664
Leie kontor 84.000 100.000 -16.000
1.975.649 1.605.000 370.649
Representasjon 171.624 80.000 91.624
Utstyrskostnader 391.241 200.000 191.241
Markedsføring/reklame 466.239 550.000 -83.761
Forsikring 22.311 0 22.311
Skatter & avgifter 207.337 0 207.337
Betalt tidligere års gjeld 146.415 0 146.415
Andre kostnader 241.853 0 241.853
Sum driftskostnader 7.324.524 4.375.000 2.949.524
 
Driftsresultat/underskudd 1.776.693 -600.000 2.376.693
 
Eksterne tjenester, herunder 
vakthold,strøm, renovasjon,underh.
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Appendix D: Press statement concerning Johannessen leaving Lost Weekend 
 
 
Angående Tom Johannessen sin permisjon fra og med 26. juli 2006 
 
Tom Johannessen har hatt mange år med oppturer og nedturer i Lost Weekend. Han blir av 
mange regnet som Mr. Lost Weekend og var mannen som først tok initiativet til festivalen.  
Lost Weekend-festivalen har vært igjennom et meget tungt år med økonomiske 
vanskeligheter og det har vært tungt å bære dette presset for alle de involverte, kanskje mest 
av alt for Johannessen. Han ble da også sykemeldt etter fjorårets festival og belastningen på 
ham som person har vært betydelig. Dette har ført til at han nå ønsker å ta seg en pust i 
bakken og nyte sommeren. Dette har ikke vært noen enkel avgjørelse for verken styret eller 
Johannessen selv men er blitt gjort av hensyn både til festivalen og person. Johannessen ser nå 
frem til å delta på LW som gjest og få oppleve festivalen han er så glad i fra et nytt 
perspektiv.  
Pga av den uheldige saken med narkotika klagene mot Lost Weekend den siste tiden vil vi 
også spesifisere at Johannessen gikk ut i permisjon flere dager før disse anklagene dukket 
opp. Det er ingen sammenheng mellom disse to sakene (noe som burde være unødvendig å 
spesifisere) og det har ikke vært noe dramatikk i forbindelse med permisjonen.  
Lost Weekend06 nærmer seg med stormskritt og Johannessen har vært en stor del av 
planleggingen og utformingen av Norges Vakreste Festival også i år.  
Når vi nå går inn i innkjøringsfasen uten en så stor ressursperson er det med blandete følelser. 
Det er en stor glede å se stadig nye ildsjeler slutte seg til Lost Weekend-familien, men 
selvsagt også vemodig å gjøre dette uten Johannessen. 
Vi ønsker Johannessen en strålende, velfortjent ferie og festivalgjestene en strålende festival-
opplevelse!   
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Appendix E: Letter to creditors 2007 
 
  
Askøy, 2. desember 2007 
 
Orientering om likviditetssituasjonen og tiltak i Lost Weekend 
Vi viser til vår tidligere kommunikasjon, hvor vi anmodet samtlige kreditorer i 
foreningen Lost Weekend om ”arbeidsro”.  Vi vil takke alle kreditorene for romslig 
og flott behandlingen, i forhold til den beklagelige økonomiske situasjonen 
foreningen befinner seg i.  Foreningen/styret i Lost Weekend har til intensjon å 
gjøre opp for seg og skal foreningen makte å betale all opparbeid gjeld er vi 
avhengig av samarbeid både med kreditorer/leverandører, kommune, 
fylkeskommune m.fl. 
Styret har arbeidet med en rekke løsninger for å rette opp økonomien. Slik det ser 
ut nå, er det ikke grunn til optimisme.  På grunn av at det er viktig for styret og 
alle medhjelperne i foreningen at festivalen skal arrangeres som et arrangement 
som i stor grad er knyttet til en ideell festival - er det ikke aktuelt å selge 
festivalen til kommersielle aktører. Det hele står og faller på kreditorenes godvilje 
ovenfor foreningen/festivalen. 
Dessverre er vi kommet i den situasjon hvor alle løsninger er utprøvd når det 
gjelder innhenting av kapital til dekning av den utestående gjelden – kommune, 
fylkeskommune er blitt forespurt med hensyn til garantier for lån og vår 
bankforbindelse er kontaktet.  Samtlige har ikke funnet å kunne bevirke med å 
skaffe/bevilge nødvendige midler for at foreningen skal klare å få betalt sine 
forpliktelser. Det er også gjort utallige forsøk på å få privatpersoner og 
næringslivet med på løsninger som kunne gitt oss et pusterom.   
Det har vært veldig nærme løsninger ved flere anledninger, men dessverre har alle 
forsøk strandet.   Det er dermed en reell fare for at Lost Weekend er historie.   
For både dere som kreditorer og foreningen Lost Weekend, er dette svært 
dramatisk.  
Det er rett og slett ingen likvide midler i foreningen.  
Med tanke på tidsaspektet opp i dette, er vi allerede nå presset for tid, med tanke 
på å få forberede og arrangere festival til neste år.   
Vi er kommet til det punktet hvor vi må få en endelig avklaring. 
Vi er klar over at dette er en uvanlig forespørsel, og i en hvilken som helst annen 
situasjon ville vi ha måtte pakket sammen og legge inn årene.  Men Lost Weekend 
er noe mer enn som så. Lost Weekend har i de siste syv årene som har gått siden 
starten, virkelig satt Bergen og Vestlandet på kartet på en positiv måte.  Vi har 
høstet lovord fra fjernt og nært og er av den oppfatning at det Lost Weekend har 
skapt disse syv årene, innenfor kultur og musikkmiljøet, har så mye positivt i seg at 
det ville være meget trist og et stort tap om LW må gi seg. 
Det er som alt annet et spørsmål om økonomi opp i alt dette, etter 2005 har vi tatt 
store steg i riktig retning.  Og klarte i 2006 å få til et fint overskudd, hvor en del av 
gjelden fra året før ble gjort opp. At vi nok en gang havner i uføre økonomisk i 
2007 er av helt andre årsaker. Svært dårlig sommervær og en ensidig fokus på det 
dårlige været i media og på alle festivaler som gikk av stabelen før oss, gjorde sitt 
til at billettsalget sviktet uken før festivalen, når vær prognosene viste dårlig vær 
også den helgen vår festival ble avholdt. Dette kombinert med et musikkprogram 
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som ikke helt slo an hos det generelle publikum, gjorde sitt til at vi kom i minus.  
Når det er sagt ble det gjort en iherdig innsats når en så at billettsalget sviktet 
med å kutte kostnader.  
Vi føler at vi har gjort store fremskritt og at vi har lært mye av det som har skjedd 
de siste to årene.  Vi funnet støtte hos Askøy Kommune og Hordaland 
Fylkeskommune, som har lovet oss til sammen kr. 1,4 mill. i driftstøtte de neste to 
årene. 
Paradoksalt nok gjør disse midlene at vi aldri i festivalens historie har stått bedre 
rustet frem mot en ny festival.  
Slik vi ser det er det absolutt størst mulighet (og eneste) for LW å kunne gjøre opp 
for seg er at vi går i gang med neste års festival.  Styret har gått gjennom regnskap 
og budsjetter, og er av den oppfatning at festivalen helt klart har potensial til å 
drive med overskudd, med sunn og forsvarlig drift.  Dette vil være det eneste 
målet for festivalen. 
Fra vår side er det ønskelig å motta en bekreftelse fra dere om at dere ønsker 
å avhjelpe festivalen ved å gi oss en gjeldsanering på 60% og er innforståtte 
med at deres krav først forfaller til betaling etter årets festival. Alternativt 
at dersom vi ikke mottar en slik bekreftelse innen 19. desember d.å. vil det 
være en bekreftelse på at dere som kreditor aksepterer en slik sanering og 
betalingsutsettelse. Vi ønsker å understreke at arbeidet med å finne løsninger 
vil fortsette og om det dukker opp løsninger som vil avhjelpe situasjonen, så 
vil dere bli informert fortløpende. 
 
Skriftlig svar bes sendes til: Lost Weekend Festivalen, Postboks 123, 5323 Kleppestø. 
Og om mulig sende en mail til: lilly@lost-weekend.net 
 
Vi vil i denne forbindelse invitere  alle våre kreditorer til informasjonsmøte tirsdag den 11. 
desember kl. 10.00, i formannskapssalen i Askøy Rådhus. 
 
For oss i foreningen Lost Weekend og spesielt for styret er en positiv 
tilbakemelding fra kreditorene med på å gi oss den tillit og motivasjon vi trenger 
for å kunne klare å betale den opparbeidede gjeld til dere.  Vi vil selvfølgelig, om 
dere er villige, bruke deres tjenester igjen om nødvendig. Vi er også smertelig klar 
over at det nødvendigvis innebærer forskuddsbetaling. 
Alle våre sponsorer har signalisert at de er med videre om vi finner en 
tilfredsstillende løsning.  Midler som kommer fra våre sponsorer vil være øremerket 
forberedelsene til en ny festival, og gir oss det handlingsrommet som er nødvendig 
for å kunne gjøre det. 
Vi vil også starte med billettsalg så snart vi er kommet til enighet med dere 
kreditorer. 
 
Med lovnadene om økonomisk støtte fra bl.a Askøy kommune, er vi forsiktige 
optimister om at vi kan få flere sponsorer med på laget frem mot LW08. Men vi må 
forberede og planlegge festivalen nå.  Om det kommer støtte fra andre sponsorer 
vil det være bonus og øke sjansene for at overskuddet kan bli stort nok til å 
betjene vår gjeld til dere. 
Vi har endret organisasjonen, og er klar til å møte de utfordringene som kommer og 
vil reise kjerringa og vise at Lost Weekend har livets rett.   
Vi har hentet inn ekstern hjelp i et regnskapsbyrå, som skal bistå oss med 
økonomien. 
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Vi har lagt ved budsjettet for 2008, som gir en pekepinn på hva styret mener er et 
realistisk resultat.  Overskuddet i sin helhet vil gå til dere kreditorer. 
Vi er helt og holdent i deres nåde, og ønsker av hele vårt hjerte å kunne gjøre opp 
for oss, men dette er ikke mulig om ikke dere kommer oss i møte og stoler på at i 
kan gjøre det. 
Vi er fullstendig klar over deres frustrasjon og skepsis, men har til nå utprøvd alle 
vår muligheter og er dessverre kommet til kort.  Vi ser dette som den siste utvei, 
for å få orden i tingene.  Vi venter ydmykt og tålmodig på deres svar. 
 
for Styret i Lost Weekend 
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Appendix F: Survey results 
Marketing 
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External influence 
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Human resources 
 
 
 
 
The Rise and Fall of Lost Weekend: A case study  146 
 
Financial resources 
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Organizational culture 
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